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ALICIA OUELLETTE*
Disability and the End of Life
The message from the disability rights community1 in the de-bate over end-of-life decisionmaking is simple and compel-
ling: the disabled are better off alive than dead.2  Any effort to
terminate life-sustaining treatment for a person who finds him-
or herself disabled is not only demeaning to all people with disa-
bilities, it also constitutes legal discrimination.3  Thus, courts and
legislatures must prevent the termination of medical treatment,
especially nutrition and hydration, in cases in which the patient
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Jerald Sharum.
1 I use the term “disability rights community” throughout this paper to refer to the
large number of disability rights activists and scholars that have come together in
opposition to laws that allow choice in dying. See, e.g. , Not Dead Yet, Articles and
Issues, Terri Schiavo, http://www.notdeadyet.org/docs/articles.html#schiavo (last vis-
ited Sept. 23, 2006) (collating the collective responses of the disability rights commu-
nity to the Schiavo  case).  These groups cannot, of course, speak for every person
with a disability, and there has been discussion and dissention within the community.
See, e.g. , Andrew I. Batavia, Ideology and Independent Living:  Will Conservatism
Harm People with Disabilities? , 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 10, 11
(1997).  Nonetheless, the unanimity of the major disability rights groups in opposi-
tion to laws allowing a family member or other surrogate to terminate life-sustaining
nutrition and hydration is remarkable. See  Lois L. Shepherd, Terri Schiavo and the
Disability Rights Community,  2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. (forthcoming 2006), available
at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=882480.
2 See  Adrienne Asch, Disability, Bioethics, and Human Rights, in HANDBOOK OF
DISABILITY STUDIES 297-301 (Gary L. Albrecht et al. eds., 2001) (stating that “the
first right of people with disabilities is a claim to life itself, along with the social
recognition of the value and validity of the life of someone with a disability”); Issues
Surrounding Terri Schindler-Schiavo Are Disability Rights Issues, Say National Disa-
bility Organizations , RAGGED EDGE MAG., Oct. 27, 2003, available at  http://www.
ragged-edge-mag.com/schiavostatement.html (setting forth a statement signed by
twenty-four disability rights groups).
3 Brief for Not Dead Yet et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 4, In re
Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (No. 2D02-5394), available at
http://www.notdeadyet.org/docs/schaivobrief.html [sic] [hereinafter Schiavo I Amici
Brief].
[123]
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has no written living will.4  The message has traction.  By engag-
ing in major lobbying efforts and court cases to press their cause,
disability groups like Not Dead Yet and activists like lawyer Har-
riet McBryde Johnson have shaken foundational principles of
law and bioethics that have for at least thirty years made it per-
missible for individuals to choose to forgo life-sustaining
treatment.5
To some degree, the success of the disability rights movement
in spreading its message is attributable to an unspoken rule that
the disability rights community is untouchable.  People outside
the community who have not experienced the life of a person
with disabilities6 dare not disagree with the disabled.  The reluc-
tance is somewhat justified: the able-bodied have not exper-
ienced the condescension and discrimination regularly inflicted
on the disabled.7
4 See, e.g., Position Statement, Nat’l Council on Indep. Living, Rights of People
with Disabilities to Food and Water (July 14, 2005), http://www.notdeadyet.org/docs/
ncilres0705.html [hereinafter NCIL Position Statement] (supporting “legislation that
restores and maintains restrictions on surrogate decisions for withholding of food
and water via tube”); Position Statement, Ctr. on Human Policy, A Statement of
Common Principles on Life-Sustaining Care and Treatment of People with Disabili-
ties, http://thechp.syr.edu/endorse (last visited Aug. 26, 2006) [hereinafter CHP Posi-
tion Statement] (noting principles endorsed by thirty-five disability rights
organizations).
5 See  Kathy L. Cerminara, Tracking the Storm:  The Far-Reaching Power of the
Forces Propelling the Schiavo Cases , 35 STETSON L. REV. 147, 159-76 (2005) (track-
ing procedural and substantive effects post-Schiavo); Lois Shepherd, Terri Schiavo:
Unsettling the Settled,  37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 297, 300 (2006) (contemplating potential
shift in decisionmaking by health care and judicial entities irrespective of statutory
modifications); Tom Mayo, Living and Dying in a Post-Schiavo World , JURIST, Dec.
3, 2005, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2005/12/living-and-dying-in-post-schiavo-
world.php (discussing unsettling changes concerning the medical treatment); NCIL
Position Statement, supra note 4. R
6 Disability scholars point out a simple truth:  except for the few people who die
suddenly, all people will experience disability.  Thus, some people suggest that those
without disabilities should be called the “temporarily abled.” See, e.g ., Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Commentary, And Now a Word About Secular Humanism, Spiri-
tuality, and the Practice of Justice and Conflict Resolution , 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1073, 1082 (2001).
7 Harriet McBryde Johnson describes the reaction she receives from most people
as “decidedly negative.”  Harriet McBryde Johnson, Unspeakable Conversations ,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2003, § 6 (Magazine).  She talks about strangers commenting to
her that they “admire you for being out” because “most people would give up,” or
kill themselves if they had to live like she does. Id .; see also JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO
PITY 12-40 (1993) (classifying the treatment received by people with disabilities as
either “Tiny Tims” or “Supercrips”).  Shapiro explains that:
[o]ften the discrimination is crude bigotry, such as that of a private New
Jersey zoo owner who refused to admit children with retardation to the
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But to a very real degree, the lack of serious scholarly chal-
lenge to the position of the community is itself patronizing.8  In-
deed, the “reflexive scorn”9 to the activists’ message and the near
silence10 in the legal literature in response to the avalanche of
disability scholarship against the termination of end-of-life treat-
ment11 is astounding.  This silence further marginalizes the very
Monkey House, claiming they scared his chimpanzees.  It may be intoler-
ance that permitted a New Jersey restaurant owner to ask a woman with
cerebral palsy to leave because her appearance was disturbing other din-
ers. . . . In other cases, however, the discrimination at issue is more subtle
because it is based on the paternalistic assumption that disabled people are
not entitled to make their own decisions and lead the lives they choose.
Id. at 25-26. See generally HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES, supra note 2, at
351-512 (documenting the experience of disability).
8 The lack of serious discourse appears to be a major source of frustration for both
activists and scholars. See, e.g. , Asch, supra note 2, at 320 (quoting the demand: R
“[n]othing about us without us . . . [w]e demand that we are included in all debates
and policy-making regarding bioethical issues”); Adrienne Asch, Recognizing Death
While Affirming Life:  Can End of Life Reform Uphold a Disabled Person’s Interest
in Continued Life? , in IMPROVING END OF LIFE CARE:  HASTINGS CTR. SPECIAL
REP., Mar.-Apr. 2003, at S31, S36 (Bruce Jennings et al. eds.) (noting that the
“largely absent disability perspective could profitably enliven the world of end of life
reform”); Not Dead Yet, What the Disability Rights Movement Wants, http://www.
notdeadyet.org/docs/drmwants0305.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2006) (demanding
“equal time in an open public discussion”).
9 Carl Schneider used the term “reflexive scorn” to describe the left’s reaction to
disability activists’ arguments against the removal of Terri Schiavo’s feeding tube.
Carl E. Schneider, Hard Cases and the Politics of Righteousness , 35 HASTINGS CTR.
REP., May-June 2005, at 24, 26.
10 To be sure, the bioethics literature contains acknowledgments of the impor-
tance of incorporating disability studies into bioethics. See  Mark G. Kuczewski, Dis-
ability:  An Agenda for Bioethics , AM. J. BIOETHICS, Summer 2001, at 36.  However,
there has been little express challenge to the disability perspective.  A short article
by Art Caplan addresses the issues of disability at the end of life head-on. See  Ar-
thur Caplan, Movie Asks the “Million Dollar” Question , MSNBC, Feb. 17, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6970787.  And Professor Kathy Cerminara argues the
fear driving the movement is unfounded.  Kathy L. Cerminara, Critical Essay:  Mus-
ings on the Need to Convince Some People with Disabilities that End-of-Life Deci-
sion-Making Advocates Are Not Out to Get Them , 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 343, 378-84
(2006); see also  Norman L. Cantor, Déjà Vu All Over Again:  The False Dichotomy
Between Sanctity of Life and Quality of Life , 35 STETSON L. REV. 81, 82-83 (2005)
(acknowledging the disability argument against quality of life considerations in end-
of-life cases); Cerminara, supra  note 5, at 159-77; Bonnie Steinbock, Disability, Pre- R
natal Testing, and Selective Abortion , in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY
RIGHTS 108 (Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 2000) (arguing against the disabil-
ity rights position on prenatal testing).
11 See SHAPIRO, supra note 7, at 237-88; Adrienne Asch, Disability: Attitudes and R
Sociological Perspectives , 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 602 (rev. ed. 1995); An-
drew I. Batavia, Disability and Physician-Assisted Suicide , 336 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1671 (1997); Andrew I. Batavia, Disability Rights in the Third Stage of the Indepen-
dent Living Movement:  Disability Community Consensus, Dissention, and the Future
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group whose marginalization moved it to action in the first place,
and leaves unanswered the very real charge of disability discrimi-
nation made by those suffering the discrimination.12  Equally
troubling, the apparent deference to the community’s message
gives the activists legitimacy in their lobbying despite theoretical
and practical flaws in their argument.13
This Article seeks to answer the call from the disability rights
community for a real debate on the role of disability in end-of-
life decisionmaking.14  In the Article, I question whether the cru-
sade by disability rights activists against freedom in medical deci-
sionmaking is in fact in the best interest of people living with
physical and mental challenges, and I conclude that it is not.  I
argue that in seeking to protect members of the disability com-
munity from perceived and real threats, the activists would limit
options for all of us by declaring how we must, or, more cor-
rectly, how we must not die.  In this way, Not Dead Yet, Harriet
of Disability Policy , 14 STAN. L. &  POL’Y REV. 347 (2003); Cerminara, supra note
5, at 159-76; Diane Coleman, Assisted Suicide and Disability:  Another Perspective , R
HUM. RTS. MAG., Winter 2000, at 6; Pamela Fadem et al., Attitudes of People with
Disabilities Toward Physician-Assisted Suicide Legislation:  Broadening the Dia-
logue , 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 977 (2003); Carol J. Gill, Health Professionals,
Disability, and Assisted Suicide:  An Examination of Relevant Empirical Evidence
and Reply to Batavia (2000) , 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 526 (2000); Stanley S.
Herr et al., No Place to Go:  Refusal of Life-Sustaining Treatment by Competent Per-
sons with Physical Disabilities , 8 ISSUES L. & MED. 3 (1992); Paul K. Longmore,
Elizabeth Bouvia, Assisted Suicide and Social Prejudice , 3 ISSUES L. & MED. 141
(1987); Paul Steven Miller, The Impact of Assisted Suicide on Persons with Disabili-
ties—Is It a Right Without Freedom? , 9 ISSUES L. & MED. 47 (1993); Nat’l Legal Ctr.
Staff, Medical Treatment for Older Persons and Persons with Disabilities:  1990 De-
velopments , 6 ISSUES L. & MED. 341 (1991); Mark Schlesinger, In the Marketplace
for Ideas Affecting Public Policy , 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 965, 970-72 (2003);
Lois Shepherd, Face to Face:  A Call for Radical Responsibility in Place of Compas-
sion , 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 445 (2003); Walter Wright, Historical Analogies, Slip-
pery Slopes, and the Question of Euthanasia , 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 176 (2000);
Teresa Harvey Paredes, Comment, The Killing Words? How the New Quality-of-Life
Ethic Affects People with Severe Disabilities , 46 SMU L. REV. 805 (1993); Jennifer
A. Zima, Note, Assisted Suicide:  Society’s Response to a Plea for Relief or a Simple
Solution to the Cries of the Needy , 23 RUTGERS L.J. 387 (1992).
12 I have been struck by the literal marginalization of disability scholars in health
law and bioethics meetings that focus on end-of-life issues as well.  I cannot claim to
have attended all or even most of the meetings, but in those I have attended, ses-
sions featuring disabilities scholars are often held at the end of a conference and
attended primarily by members of the community.
13 Lennard Davis argues that the lack of nuance in disability studies is attributable
to the community’s lack of cultural literacy. See Lennard J. Davis, Life, Death, and
Biocultural Literacy , CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 6, 2006, at 9.
14 See, e.g. , Not Dead Yet, supra  note 8 (demanding “equal time in open public
discussion”).
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McBryde Johnson, and other disability rights activists pose a di-
rect and immediate threat to the laws that give families choices in
decisionmaking at the end of life.  Their advocacy may well lead
to perniciously paternalistic legal action that will disable all of
us—people with and without disabilities—by eliminating medi-
cally appropriate and morally acceptable options for medical
decisionmaking at the end of life.
I argue further that although the theory underlying the activist
agenda has its roots in disability studies, it does not withstand
scrutiny.  The theory that laws allowing choice in dying perpetu-
ate disability discrimination is flawed by conflation, inflation, mi-
sidentification, and a misplaced operational definition of
disability.  Specifically, the theory conflates dying with disability
and misidentifies a persistent vegetative state as a disability that
permits meaningful life.  The conflation derives from a misplaced
operational definition of disability that insists that all people fed
by feeding tubes are the same.  The conflation and misidentifica-
tion allow the community to cast decisions to withhold or with-
draw feeding tubes as disability prejudice, when such decisions
are, in fact, an affirmation of autonomy and a showing of respect
for individual values.
By disproving the underlying theory and exposing the negative
practical implications of the disability agenda, I hope to derail
the community’s effort to turn back thirty years of progress in
protecting patients and their families at the end of life.  That said,
my conclusion is not that the disability rights community has
nothing of value to add to policy surrounding end-of-life deci-
sionmaking.  To the contrary, while I disagree with the extreme
position of what I call the new activists,15 I argue that much of
the community’s message has merit.  Judges, bioethicists, law-
yers, legislatures, and health care providers should take concrete
steps to stop the palpable discrimination that triggered the politi-
cal movement in the first place and to alleviate the fear and hurt
that has driven scholars and activists to extreme positions.  I ar-
gue that two steps are necessary to achieve this goal.  First,
courts, bioethicists, and lawyers must stop justifying autonomous
decisions to refuse treatment as reasonable by devaluing life with
disability.  Second, health care providers and policymakers, in-
15 I use the term “new activists” to distinguish the new breed of disability rights
advocates, like those involved with Not Dead Yet, from the less militant activists
who worked for passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
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cluding institutional ethics boards, should reevaluate the notion
of informed consent in cases of sudden disability to incorporate
the evidence from empirical studies by disability scholars.
Part I of this paper introduces the activists and scholars who
make up the disability rights community, explores the history of
the disability rights movement, and sets forth the message, the-
ory, and demands of the activists with respect to end-of-life deci-
sionmaking.  Part II discusses how the community has effectively
changed public discourse about choices in dying.  Part III ex-
poses the danger posed by the community’s demands, and identi-
fies the conflation, inflation, and misidentification that
undermine the theory that choice in dying is disability discrimi-
nation.  Part IV argues that although they should not erode laws
that allow the disabled and their families’ choice in dying, policy-
makers, scholars, judges, lawyers, and health care providers
should heed much of the message coming from the community.
In particular, judges should avoid perpetuating the tragic myth of
life with disability and focus instead on autonomy and the pro-
cess of informed consent.  At the same time, scholars, policymak-
ers, and providers should rethink what it means to obtain
informed consent in cases of sudden disability in light of evidence
generated by disability scholars.  Part V concludes by issuing a
challenge to both sides of the debate.
I
THE MESSENGERS AND THE MESSAGE
The disability rights community consists of both activists and
scholars.  Neither faction purports to speak for every person with
a disability,16 but, as the following discussion shows, both groups
present a remarkably coherent message.17  Moreover, the activ-
16 See  Adrienne Asch, Distracted by Disability , CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE
ETHICS, Jan. 1998, at 77, 81.  Asch explains the difficulties with defining a disability
rights community, but asserts that:
what people with disabilities share is the experience that their departure
from what is species typical makes them the objects of unequal treatment
such as denial of employment or education for which they qualify. . . .
[M]ore than half of the respondents [to a 1994 survey] perceived them-
selves to be a member of a minority and accepted the notion that they were
indeed members of a disability community.
Id.
17 The loudest dissenting voice from within the disability rights community is An-
drew Batavia’s.  Batavia started an organization called Autonomy that “represents
the interests of people with disabilities who wish to exercise choice in all aspects of
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-1\ORE103.txt unknown Seq: 7 30-NOV-06 14:07
2006] Disability and the End of Life 129
ists speak for what they have defined as the disability rights
community.18
It is not clear whether the activism around disability rights led
to the field of disability studies or if the early disability scholars
triggered activism among the ranks.19  In either case, the scholar-
ship in the field nourishes the activist agenda, and the activism
generates scholarly discussion.20
A. Disability Studies:  The Brain Behind the Machine
Disability studies deconstructs the myth of the tragic life of the
person with disabilities.  The field is rich and varied;21 it incorpo-
rates Marxism, feminist postmodernism, and poststructuralism.
It emphasizes, among other things, the social oppression of the
disabled and the cultural perception of life with disability.22
[their] lives, including choice at the end of life.” See  Autonomy, Mission & Princi-
ples, www.autonomynow.org/mission.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).
18 See, e.g. , Press Release, Not Dead Yet, Schiavo Case Is About Disability Rights
(Mar. 20, 2005), http://www.notdeadyet.org/docs/schiavostatement032005.html (re-
ferring to the “disability rights community”).
19 For a more thorough overview of the growth of the disability rights movement
and its impact on federal law, see SHAPIRO, supra  note 7, and Jonathan C. Drimmer, R
Comment, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights:  Tracing the Evolution of Federal
Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities , 40 UCLA L. REV. 1341
(1993). See also  David L. Braddock & Susan L. Parish, An Institutional History of
Disability , in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES, supra  note 2, at 44 (citing to
writings of blind Americans in the 1950s as introducing the theoretical basis for the
social construction of disability).
20 See, e.g. , MARY JOHNSON, MAKE THEM GO AWAY:  CLINT EASTWOOD, CHRIS-
TOPHER REEVE AND THE CASE AGAINST DISABILITY RIGHTS (2003) (marrying the
activist agenda of Not Dead Yet, of which Johnson is the founder, to disability
theory).
21 For example, James I. Charlton analyzes disability oppression and activism
from an international perspective. JAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT US WITH-
OUT US:  DISABILITY OPPRESSION AND EMPOWERMENT (1998).  Joseph Shapiro
traces the history of the movement in his book, No Pity . SHAPIRO, supra note 7. R
Michelle Fine and Adrienne Asch explore disability from a feminist perspective.
WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES:  ESSAYS IN PSYCHOLOGY, CULTURE, AND POLITICS
(Michelle Fine & Adrienne Asch eds., 1988).  Nancy L. Eiesland applies disability
theory to liberation theology in The Disabled God.  NANCY L. EIESLAND, THE DIS-
ABLED GOD:  TOWARD A LIBERATORY THEOLOGY OF DISABILITY (1994). See also
DISABILITY STUDIES:  ENABLING THE HUMANITIES (Sharon L. Snyder et al. eds.,
2002) (integrating disability studies into humanities teaching and scholarship); THE
HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES:  DIFFERENT BUT
EQUAL (Stanley Herr et al. eds., 2003) (exploring human rights issues); JULIE
SMART, DISABILITY, SOCIETY, AND THE INDIVIDUAL (2001) (discussing the disability
experience from the perspective of disabled individuals).
22 Gareth Williams, Theorizing Disability , in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES,
supra note 2, at 124.
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From all perspectives, the central tenet of disability studies is
the rejection of the medical model of disability as a foundation
for effective understanding of impairment or disability.23  “The
medical view of disability . . . treats the individual as deficient
and inherently inferior because she falls below an arbitrary phys-
iological standard that delineates social acceptance and that can
only be ‘normalized’ and incorporated into society through a
medical cure.”24  Falling below the physiologic standard is prob-
lematic, in the medical view of disability, because “impairments
of normal species functioning reduce the range of opportunity
open to the individual . . . [to] construct a ‘plan of life’ or ‘con-
ception of the good.’”25  Thus, the medical view of disability es-
sentially locates the problems caused by disability in the disabled
individual.
Historic events provide vivid examples of how the medicaliza-
tion of disability harms people with disabilities.  The eugenics
program in Nazi Germany may be the most obvious example—
Nazi medical centers killed a quarter of a million disabled people
because they were considered “useless eaters”26—but the United
States has also engaged in outright disability discrimination
through forced institutionalization, sterilization, and eugenics.27
Notably, Justice Marshall compared this country’s treatment of
23 Id .
24 Drimmer, supra  note 19, at 1348; see also  Asch, supra  note 2, at 300 (noting R
that some define a person as “healthy if the person’s organism performs species-
typical functions with statistically typical efficiency”).
25 NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE:  STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND
HEALTH POLICY 27 (1985).
26 Stephen L. Mikochik, Assisted Suicide and Disabled People,  46 DEPAUL L.
REV. 987, 999 (1987).  Mikochik points to a quote from Leo Alexander, chief medi-
cal consultant at Nuremberg, who observed the Nazi atrocities:
Whatever proportions these crimes finally assumed, it became evident to
all who investigated them that they had started from small beginnings, . . .
at first merely a subtle shift in emphasis in the basic attitude of physicians.
It started with the acceptance of the attitude, basic in the euthanasia move-
ment, that there is such a thing as a life not worthy to be lived.  This atti-
tude in its early stages concerned itself merely with the severely and
chronically sick.  Gradually, the sphere of those to be included in this cate-
gory was enlarged to encompass the socially unproductive, the ideologi-
cally unwanted, the racially unwanted and finally all non-Aryans.  But it is
important to realize that the infinitely small wedged-in lever from which
this entire trend of mind received its impetus was the attitude toward the
non-rehabilitable sick.
Id. at 999 n.82 (citing Joan R. Bullock, Abortion Rights in America , 1994 BYU L.
REV. 63, 69 n.30).
27 The American experience, at least as to sterilization, preceded World War I.
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the disabled to the Jim Crow regime.28
Similarly, Justice Holmes famously confirmed that the United
States viewed people with disabilities as the problem when he
sanctioned the forced sterilization of Carrie Buck:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call
upon the best citizens for their lives.  It would be strange if it
could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the
State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by
those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with
incompetence.  It is better for all the world, if instead of wait-
ing to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them
starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.  The principle that
sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cut-
ting the Fallopian tubes.  Three generations of imbeciles are
enough.29
The “Baby Doe” cases provide another example of the prob-
lematic results of the medical view of disability.  “Baby John
Doe” was born in 1982 in Bloomington, Indiana.  He had Down
syndrome and an esophageal blockage.  The blockage was treata-
ble with a relatively minor surgical correction, but his parents
opted against the surgery because of advice given to them by
their physician about the dismal prospects for a person living
with Down syndrome.  The baby died of starvation at six days
old.30  In a similar case, the parents of “Baby Jane Doe” declined
surgery for their daughter, who had been born with spina bifida
and hydrocephalus, based on the advice of their physicians.31
Both babies were denied treatment that could have alleviated
certain of their medical problems because they had permanent
disabilities that no medical treatment could cure.  To disability
See  Philip R. Reilly, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION:  A HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY
STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 30-40 (1991).
28 Mikochik, supra  note 26, at 1000 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living R
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 461-62 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
29 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (citation omitted).
30 See Angie L. Guevara, Note, In re K.I.:  An Urgent Need for a Uniform System
in the Treatment of the Critically Ill Infant—Recognizing the Sanctity of Life of the
Child , 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 237, 238-39 (2001), for an account of the “Baby Doe” litiga-
tion.  Ultimately, certiorari was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1983.  Infant
Doe v. Bloomington Hosp., 464 U.S. 961 (1983).
31 Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686 (App. Div. 1983).  This
case led to a 1983 President’s Commission report that would disallow denial of sur-
gery to “an otherwise healthy Down [s]yndrome child whose life is threatened by a
surgically correctable complication.”  Asch, supra  note 2, at 303; see Guevara, supra R
note 30, at 240-41. R
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rights scholars, the denial of treatment in the Baby Doe cases
“represented a kind of discrimination against people with disabil-
ities by the medical profession and frightened parents who were
unable to imagine having a child with a disability as anything but
a tragedy and disaster . . . .”32
Instead of a medical view of disability, disability scholars view
disability as “a socially constructed condition, through which the
‘problem’ is defined as ‘a dominating attitude by professionals
and others, inadequate support services when compared with so-
ciety generally, as well as attitudinal, architectural, sensory, cog-
nitive and economic barriers.’”33  As stated by one scholar:
[T]he “socio-political” model of disability views disability as
“a product of interaction between health status and the de-
mands of one’s physical and social environment,” and “lo-
cates” disability in the interface between the individual and
her environment.  In doing so, the socio-political model of dis-
ability (and a related construct—the minority model) stand in
stark contrast to the medical model of disability, “which re-
gards disability as a defect or sickness which must be cured
through medical intervention,” and which expressly locates
the “problem” in the disabled person.34
Under a social view of disability, a paralyzed person who can-
not get into a building because the entrance is at the top of the
stairs is not “disabled” by his or her physical impairments.  The
disability results from the social failure to provide wheelchair ac-
cessible ramps.  Thus, “the culprit is not biological, psychic, or
cognitive equipment but the social, institutional, and physical
world in which people with impairments must function—a world
designed with the characteristics and needs of the nondisabled
majority in mind” in which “[a]n impaired arm becomes a man-
ual disability or social handicap only because of the interaction of
a particular physiology with a specific social, legal, and attitudi-
nal environment.”35
The prevailing message in the scholarship is that life with disa-
32 Asch, supra  note 2, at 304. R
33 Laura L. Rovner, Disability, Equality, and Identity , 55 ALA. L. REV. 1043, 1043-
44 (2004) (citing Deborah Kaplan, The Definition of Disability:  Perspective of the
Disability Community , 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 352, 352-53 (2000)). See, e.g. ,
Michelle Fine & Adrienne Asch, Disability Beyond Stigma:  Social Interaction, Dis-
crimination, and Activism , 44 J. SOC. ISSUES 3, 8-15 (1988) (challenging social psy-
chology’s assumptions of disability).
34 Rovner, supra note 33, at 1044 (footnotes omitted). R
35 Asch, supra  note 2, at 300. R
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bility is not tragedy.36  Rather, the tragedy is the failure of social
institutions to help people with physical impairments to lead pro-
ductive lives.  Thus, disability scholars argue that “rules, laws,
means of communication, characteristics of buildings and transit
systems, the typical eight-hour work day, and aesthetic prefer-
ences all exclude some people from participating in school, work,
civic, or social life.”37  Given appropriate accommodation by so-
ciety, a disabled person can have a rewarding life.38
Disability scholars have proved their point in part through em-
pirical studies that reveal that “people who experience disabil-
ity—whether it be congenital or acquired, whether sensory,
cognitive, motor, or other—can find considerable reward and
satisfaction in their lives.”39  Indeed, studies have consistently
shown that the number of people with disabilities who found sat-
isfaction in their lives far exceeds predictions by health
professionals.40
Disability scholars view court cases involving medical decision-
making as statements about the tragedy of life with disability.
According to the literature, courts have accepted and perpetu-
ated two incorrect assumptions in allowing people to forgo medi-
cal treatment and choose death over life with disability:  “First,
the life of someone with a chronic illness or disability . . . is for-
ever disrupted . . . . Second, if a disabled person experiences iso-
36 Id.
37 Id.  Adrienne Asch criticizes bioethics thus:
[B]ioethics insists that individuals should be able to determine the situa-
tions under which they find life intolerable but has never challenged them
to ask themselves what they found intolerable.  Nor has bioethics suggested
that what was unacceptable might not be inherent in quadriplegia, stroke,
or a degenerative neurological disorder but instead could result from the
social arrangements facing people living with such conditions.
Asch, supra  note 2, at 299. R
38 Id.  The Americans with Disabilities Act was a major victory for disability
scholars and activists.  42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (2000).  It adopted as law the rule
that society had the obligation to offer people with disabilities a better quality of life
and the opportunity to contribute meaningfully to society.
39 Asch, supra  note 2, at 301.  The evidence shows that “even those who work
most closely with the disabled underestimate their quality of life.”  Kuczewski, supra
note 10, at 39. R
40 See  Asch, supra  note 2, at 301 (citing eleven such studies); see also NATIONAL R
ORGANIZATION ON DISABILITY, N.O.D./HARRIS SURVEY OF AMERICANS WITH DIS-
ABILITIES 85-90 (1994) (comparing life satisfaction of people with and without disa-
bilities); Saroj Saigal et al., Self-Perceived Health Status and Health-Related Quality
of Life of Extremely Low-Birth-Weight Infants at Adolescence,  276 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 453, 455-57 (1996) (evaluating self-assessed quality of life of adolescents who
were extremely low-birth-weight infants).
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lation, powerlessness, poverty, unemployment, or low social
status, these are inevitable consequences of biological
limitation.”41
The case of Elizabeth Bouvia tells the story.42  Elizabeth
Bouvia, a twenty-eight-year-old woman who had cerebral palsy
and arthritis, asked a California court to remove a nasogastric
tube and allow her to die of starvation.  Bouvia was not termi-
nally ill but the court granted her wish.43  Lawyers and scholars
pressing autonomy as the gold standard in medical decisionmak-
ing hailed the Bouvia  case as a landmark victory because it af-
firmed that even those who are not terminally ill can decline
treatment, and that artificial nutrition and hydration is medical
treatment.44  Disability scholars read Bouvia  very differently.
They saw Elizabeth Bouvia as a person with disabilities who
lacked the social support necessary to allow her life to have
meaning.45  They pointed out that she demanded the right to
starve herself only after she had a miscarriage, her husband left
her, her family abandoned her, the county failed to find a suita-
ble place to house her, and she was forced to withdraw from
graduate school because the dean believed her disability made
her an inappropriate student.46
41 Asch, supra  note 2, at 300. R
42 Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986).  Disabilities
scholars frequently cite to two other cases to make the same point: Georgia v. Mc-
Afee , 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989), and McKay v. Bergstedt , 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
43 Elizabeth Bouvia chose not to end her life after the court granted her wish to
die.  On a 1997 60 Minutes  broadcast, she explained her decision:
Mike  Wallace:  (voiceover) After several attempts at starvation, Elizabeth
told us, it just became physically too difficult to do.  She didn’t want to die
a slow, agonizing death, nor to do it in the spotlight of public scrutiny.  And
she told us, with great regret, she quietly chose to live.
Ms. Bouvia:  Starvation is not an easy way to go.
Wallace:  Oh, no.
Ms. Bouvia:  You can’t just keep doing it and keep doing it.  It really
messes up your body.  And my body was already messed up.
JERRY MENIKOFF, LAW AND BIOETHICS:  AN INTRODUCTION 262 (2001).
44 See, e.g. , S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Beyond Misguided Paternalism:  Resusci-
tating the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment , 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1035, 1084-
85 (1998) (“The approach provided in the . . . Bouvia case[ ] reflect[s] respect for the
rights of patient autonomy.”); Jerry Menikoff, Demanded Medical Care , 30 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1091, 1091 (1998) (noting that “‘[p]atient autonomy’ is now accepted as the
gold standard for ethical decision-making when recommended care conflicts with a
patient’s wishes”).
45 See, e.g., Longmore, supra  note 11, at 157.
46 Asch, supra  note 2, at 311. R
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Disability scholars saw Bouvia’s plight as a classic case of soci-
ety failing a person with disability.  The appropriate answer to
Bouvia’s situation, argued disability scholars, was social support
and intervention, not acquiescence to her demand for death.47
The community saw the court’s decision to allow Bouvia to
starve herself as judicial confirmation that lives with disability are
not worth living.
The judge who authored Bouvia  gave disability scholars many
reasons to believe that the decision was not about autonomy, but
about disability discrimination.48 The court went to great lengths
to describe in painstaking detail the physical elements of
Bouvia’s disability.  It then explained that her decision that her
life had no meaning was reasonable:  “Her mind and spirit may
be free to take great flights but she herself is imprisoned, and
must lie physically helpless subject to the ignominy, embarrass-
ment, humiliation and dehumanizing aspects created by her help-
lessness.”49  Thus, the judge asserted that disability had ruined
Bouvia’s life, that “such life has been physically destroyed and its
quality, dignity and purpose [are] gone.”50  Without exploring the
implications of the social changes in Bouvia’s life, the judge char-
acterized extending her life as “monstrous.”51
The functional limitations faced by Bouvia mirrored those of
many disability rights leaders who could live for decades with the
assistance of medical treatment and technology.52  Thus, unlike
the earlier cases that involved decisionmaking for people who
were permanently unconscious or terminally ill,53 the case got the
47 See, e.g ., Longmore, supra  note 11, at 144.
48 The 1996 decision in Compassion in Dying v. Washington  that supported physi-
cian-assisted suicide also portrayed life with disabilities as hopeless.  The court re-
ferred to people with physical impairments as existing in “a childlike state of
helplessness” exemplified by physical immobility or by their use of diapers to deal
with incontinence.  79 F.3d 790, 814 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d sub nom. Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).  Similarly, in Georgia v. McAfee , the court de-
scribed the plaintiff, a ventilator-dependent man who been needlessly housed in a
hospital ICU for months as being “incapable of spontaneous respiration, and . . .
dependent upon a ventilator to breathe.  According to the record there is no hope
that Mr. McAfee’s condition will improve with time, nor is there any known medical
treatment which can improve his condition.”  385 S.E.2d 651, 651 (Ga. 1989).
49 Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (Ct. App. 1986).
50 Id.  The “monstrous” language used in Bouvia  was quoted by the court in
McKay v. Bergstedt .  801 P.2d 617, 624 (Nev. 1990).
51 Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
52 Asch, supra  note 2, at 312. R
53 See, e.g. , Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (al-
lowing terminally ill patient to refuse life-sustaining treatment); In re Quinlan, 355
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-1\ORE103.txt unknown Seq: 14 30-NOV-06 14:07
136 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85, 123
attention of disability scholars.  They read Bouvia  as confirma-
tion that laws that provided patients choice in medical decision-
making were really a legal judgment that their lives were not
worth living.54
Following Bouvia , disability scholars started to question
whether such cases were really about autonomy, a principle cher-
ished by the community, or about a new eugenics.55  They argued
that “[the nondisabled public] readily conclude[s] that the dis-
abled person’s wish to die is reasonable because it agrees with
[the] preconception that the primary problem for such individu-
als is the unbearable experience of a permanent disability. . . . If
permanent disability is the problem, death is the solution.”56
Disability scholars further observed that “[w]hen the nondis-
abled say they want to die, they are labelled [sic] as suicidal; if
they are disabled, it is treated as ‘natural’ or ‘reasonable.’”57
To disability scholars, the willingness of courts and the public
to accept as reasonable the wish to die exemplified a lack of so-
cial recognition for the value and validity of a disabled life.58
From a disability perspective, courts failed by focusing on limita-
tions created by physical impairment, instead of focusing on the
ways “in which law, medicine, bioethics, and government pro-
grams failed to help traumatically disabled patients discover the
financial, technological, social, and psychological resources that
could sustain them and provide the opportunity for rewarding
life.”59
Thus the first right of people with disabilities became “a claim
to life itself.”60  Laws that allow the refusal of treatment became
suspect.  Disability scholarship came to question the emphasis in
current law on autonomy as the paramount concern in end-of-life
cases.61  The skepticism became especially pronounced when the
A.2d 647, 672 (N.J. 1976) (allowing family to terminate treatment for permanently
unconscious patient).
54 See, e.g. , Longmore, supra  note 11, at 144.
55 See  Herr et al., supra  note 11, at 36.
56 Carol J. Gill, Suicide Intervention for People with Disabilities:  A Lesson in Ine-
quality , 8 ISSUES L. & MED. 37, 39 (1992).
57 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 593 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing
Gill, supra note 56, at 38-39), aff’d en banc , 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d sub
nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
58 See Asch, supra  note 2, at 301. R
59 Asch, supra  note 8, at S34. R
60 Asch, supra  note 2, at 301. R
61 Asch, supra  note 8, at S33 (pointing to the “danger of relying on a simple no- R
tion of patient autonomy when deciding to withdraw life-sustaining treatment”).
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nation turned its attention to the question of physician-assisted
suicide.62  Disability scholars strongly opposed physician-assisted
suicide, arguing expressly that right-to-die cases “reflect a socie-
tal prejudice that devalues the worth of disabled persons’
lives.”63  As a result, scholars urged “clinicians and policy-makers
to question how truly autonomous is anyone’s wish to die
when living with changed, feared, and uncertain physical
impairments.”64
In time, scholars criticized laws that allow family members to
withhold treatment.65  As one scholar noted, “Even a demonstra-
bly loving and involved family may be unable to put aside its own
view of how limited life with disability is to imagine such a life
from the vantage point of someone with the impairment.”66  In
keeping with its position, disability scholars applauded the New
York Court of Appeals when it refused to allow the mother of a
man with profound mental retardation the option of declining
treatment for her son’s cancer.67  The mother had provided good
care to her son throughout his life, but was concerned that the
treatments were unduly upsetting to him.  The court held that no
one, not even a loving family member, could decline life-saving
treatment for someone who has not expressed his or her own
wish to refuse treatment.68
62 See  Conference Transcript, Socially-Assisted Dying:  Media, Money & Meaning ,
7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267, 270-94 (1998) (illustrating views of “proponents
and opponents from the disability community” concerning assisted death); Yale
Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide—Even a Very Limited Form , 72 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 735, 740-43 (1995); M. Cathleen Kaveny, Managed Care, Assisted Suicide,
and Vulnerable Populations , 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 1299-1307 (1998) (dis-
cussing the dangers of physician-assisted suicide in American health care institutions
and its repercussions on vulnerable populations); Mikochik, supra  note 26, at 995- R
1002.
63 Adam A. Milani, Better Off Dead than Disabled?:  Should Courts Recognize a
“Wrongful Living” Cause of Action When Doctors Fail to Honor Patients’ Advance
Directives? , 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 149, 198 (1997); accord Coleman, supra  note
11, at 6; Fadem, supra  note 11, at 987-88; Gill, supra  note 11, at 528-32; Longmore, R
supra  note 11, at 152, 166-68. R
64 Asch, supra  note 8, at S33. R
65 Asch, supra note 2, at 310. R
66 Id.  at 309.
67 In re  Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 73 (N.Y. 1981).
68 Id. ; see also In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y.
1988) (“[N]o person or court should substitute its judgment as to what would be an
acceptable quality of life for another.”).  The Storar and Westchester decisions have
been roundly criticized by people who advocate for self-determination as the para-
mount concern. E.g.,  Hon. Stewart F. Hancock, Jr., The Role of the Judge in Medi-
cal Treatment Decisions , 57 ALB. L. REV. 647, 652-53 & n.25 (1994).  Obviously,
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In addition to questioning the ability of family members to
make decisions for their disabled loved ones, some disability
scholars question the notion of precedent autonomy.  Precedent
autonomy is the concept that supports living wills.69  It allows
people to decide in advance what medical decisions should be
implemented if they later become unable to express their wishes,
and requires health care providers to act on those decisions.  Dis-
ability scholars are suspicious of such directives, believing that
people who are not disabled cannot imagine that life with a disa-
bility would be rewarding.70  According to the scholars, rather
than blindly following advance directives, treatment should be
evaluated from the viewpoint of the recently disabled individ-
ual.71  If a person appears to take pleasure in her current state of
disability, that current state should be maintained despite previ-
ously expressed wishes to avoid life in a disabled state.
Thus, disability scholarship calls into question the role of au-
tonomy, families, and advance directives in end-of-life decision-
making.  The bottom line, argues scholar Adrienne Asch, is that
“[i]t is crucial for anyone seeking to advance the dignity and
worth of people with all disabilities to promote their participa-
tion in life-and-death decisions and to circumscribe family deci-
sionmaking on behalf of those who have less than full legal
authority to make their own decisions.”72
B. The Birth of a New Advocacy
Disability studies is inextricably linked with disability rights ac-
tivism.  The thoughtful analysis of legal-medical issues by disabil-
ity theorists has given rise to a political force.  The early political
activism of the disability movement, as supported by the devel-
oping scholarship, led to legislation like the Rehabilitation Act
and eventually to the Americans with Disabilities Act.73
The disabilities movement took on a different form—what I
call a new activism—in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  The origi-
nal focus of the new activists was not medical cases; it was the
someone who has never been competent to express his wishes could never refuse
medical care.
69 Leslie Pickering Francis, Decisionmaking at the End of Life:  Patients with
Alzheimer’s or Other Dementias , 35 GA. L. REV. 539, 551, 569-76 (2001).
70 Asch, supra note 2, at 310. R
71 Id.
72 Id.  at 311.
73 Rovner, supra note 33, at 1059-62.
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Jerry Lewis Muscular Dystrophy Association Telethon.  Disabil-
ity activists consider telethons that trot out disabled children as
mascots “demeaning and exploitative of disability as tragic and
catastrophic.”74  Evan Kemp, Jr., former chair of the federal
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, presented the ear-
liest public critique of telethons in a 1981 New York Times  edito-
rial, in which he stated that “[b]y arousing the public’s fear of the
handicap itself, the telethon makes viewers more afraid of handi-
capped people. . . . The telethon’s critical stress on the need to
find cures supports the damaging and common prejudice that
handicapped people are ‘sick.’”75  A decade after Kemp’s cri-
tique was published, the early activists began to demonstrate
against the telethons.76  The activists’ message was angrier than
Kemp’s.77  One activist protested, “It’s all about stirring up pity,
when we don’t want pity.  And Jerry Lewis ought to be fired.  He
actually called people in wheelchairs ‘half persons.’”78
Having organized against telethons, the new activists turned
their attention to court actions involving medical decisionmak-
ing, where they participated with limited attention for many
years.79  The organized activity culminated, of course, in the case
of Terri Schiavo.  One of the most powerful voices in the Schiavo
case was Harriet McBryde Johnson’s.  McBryde Johnson is a dis-
ability rights lawyer and activist who lives with a neuromuscular
74 Sharon Barnartt et al., Advocacy and Political Action , in HANDBOOK OF DISA-
BILITY STUDIES, supra note 2, at 441 (referring to eighteen protests against telethons
in 1992 and ten protests in 1993).
75 Evan J. Kemp, Jr., Op-Ed., Aiding the Disabled:  No Pity, Please, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 1981, at A19; see also SHAPIRO, supra note 7, at 23-24 (quoting id .) . R
76 See SHAPIRO, supra  note 7, at 24-26. R
77 See HARRIET MCBRYDE JOHNSON, TOO LATE TO DIE YOUNG:  NEARLY TRUE
TALES FROM A LIFE 50 (2005).  McBryde Johnson explains her reaction to telethons:
Together in the crip ghetto, my friends and I watched the annual parade of
our little doppelgängers being publicly sentenced to death. . . . Later, hav-
ing moved on to the mainstream world, I wanted to go to law school, qual-
ify for scholarships, get a job and a car loan, start a business.  But dying
children aren’t allowed to do such things; they can’t be trusted to fulfill
their obligations.
Id.
78 Id.  at 48.
79 Milani, supra  note 63, at 209-12 (describing intervention by activists on behalf
of Kenneth Bergstedt, a Nevada man who became quadriplegic and dependent on a
ventilator as a result of a swimming accident at age ten).  At age thirty-one, faced
with the imminent death of his ill father, Kenneth petitioned the court to allow his
father to turn off his respirator. See  McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 624-25 (Nev.
1990).
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degenerative disease that has left her, in her words, “a jumble of
bones in a floppy bag of skin.”80  She is not able to walk, stand,
lift heavy objects, or swallow solid foods.81  To keep herself up-
right in her chair, she leans forward, rests her rib cage on her lap
and plants her elbows beside her knees.82  She eats puréed food,
lacks the physical strength to get out of bed on her own, and will
someday soon need to eat though a feeding tube.
McBryde Johnson is anything but weak.  Her mind has the
strength and agility her body lacks.83  Her writing is wicked,
sharp, insightful, and funny.84  Her oral presentations are equally
compelling.  She uses personal stories and insights strengthened
by her physical weakness to advocate her positions on issues in-
volving life and death.85  Specifically, she uses the strongest sort
of identity politics, legal acumen, and powerful straight talk to
argue against choice in medical decisionmaking.  Her message
resonates.
Harriet McBryde Johnson came to national prominence when
she published a cover story in the New York Times Magazine .86
In the article, McBryde Johnson described her experience at
Princeton University in which she confronted ethicist Peter
Singer.  She saw the debate with Singer as personal, stating:
[Peter Singer] doesn’t want to kill me.  He simply thinks it
would have been better, all things considered, to have given
my parents the option of killing the baby I once was, and to let
other parents kill similar babies as they come along and
thereby avoid the suffering that comes with lives like mine and
satisfy the reasonable preferences of parents for a different
kind of child.87
80 McBryde Johnson, supra note 7. R
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 She has a B.S. in history from Charleston Southern University, a Master’s in
Public Administration from the College of Charleston, and a J.D. from the Univer-
sity of South Carolina.  Biography of Harriet McBryde Johnson, http://www.nd.edu/
~ndr/issues/ndr8/johnson/bio.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2006).
84 See generally MCBRYDE JOHNSON, supra  note 77. R
85 Id.
86 McBryde Johnson, supra note 7. R
87 Id.  McBryde Johnson’s description of Singer’s position is accurate. See gener-
ally HELGA KUHSE & PETER SINGER, SHOULD THE BABY LIVE?  THE PROBLEM OF
HANDICAPPED INFANTS iii (1985) (“This book contains conclusions which some
readers will find disturbing.  We think that some infants with severe disabilities
should be killed.”); PETER SINGER, RETHINKING LIFE AND DEATH:  THE COLLAPSE
OF OUR TRADITIONAL ETHICS 128-31 (1994); Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer, Ethics
and the Handicapped Newborn Infant , 52 SOC. RES. 505, 527-34 (1985) (advancing
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McBryde Johnson first met Singer when she attended a lecture
entitled “Rethinking Life and Death” in the spring of 2001 at the
College of Charleston.88  She confronted him during the question
and answer session, and their dialogue continued by e-mail over
the next year.  Eventually, Singer invited McBryde Johnson to
debate him at Princeton.  They worked out an arrangement for
two presentations by McBryde Johnson.  She detailed and re-
flected upon her talks in an article titled “Unspeakable Conver-
sations,” in which she challenged Singer’s abstract philosophical
thinking with her lived experience.89  The article became regular
reading in bioethics, philosophy, and disabilities law classes
across the country.
McBryde Johnson continued to argue against Singer’s radical
position in the years that followed.  She presented numerous lec-
tures and continued her work as a disability rights lawyer.  She
showed up on the national stage again during the Schiavo
debacle.
Perhaps more than any other statement on the case, McBryde
Johnson’s short commentary titled “Not Dead at All:  Why Con-
gress Was Right to Stick Up for Terri Shiavo” succinctly and
powerfully argued against the withdrawal of Terri Schiavo’s feed-
ing tube.90  In the commentary, she made ten points which can be
summarized as follows: Schiavo was not terminally ill; artificial
nutrition and hydration are not life support and are not treat-
ment; since Schiavo was not suffering, her death could not be
justified as relieving suffering; no one could determine what Schi-
avo’s wishes were at the time the decision to terminate treatment
was made; Schiavo had a federal constitutional right not to be
deprived of her life without due process; terminating nutrition
and hydration for Schiavo would violate the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act; fear of feeding tubes is a form of disability
prejudice; and the federal government did not take sides by pass-
ing a law to allow the federal courts to step into the Schiavo case
after it had been resolved in the state courts.91
theory that infanticide “before the onset of self-awareness” poses no threat); Peter
Singer, Which Babies Are Too Expensive to Treat? , 1 BIOETHICS 275 (1987).
88 McBryde Johnson, supra note 7. R
89 Id.
90 Harriet McBryde Johnson, Not Dead at All: Why Congress Was Right to Stick
Up for Terri Schiavo , SLATE, Mar. 23, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2115208, re-
printed in  Editorial, Overlooked in the Shadows , WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2005, at A19.
91 See id.
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McBryde Johnson’s arguments paralleled those made in briefs
to the court and in position papers by the disability rights group
Not Dead Yet.  Not Dead Yet is a national disability rights group
that has taken the lead in opposing the legalization of assisted
suicide, euthanasia, and the termination of life-sustaining treat-
ment.92  The group stages noisy demonstrations with its members
arriving at courtrooms, lecture halls, and rallies in a mass of
wheelchairs.  Members carry signs that say “Health Care Not
Death Care” and “Medical Ethicists Are Not Ethical.”93  Fur-
ther, they submit briefs in court cases94 and lobby heavily in state
legislatures.95
Not Dead Yet showed up well before the media, President
Bush, or Senator Bill Frist noticed Terri Schiavo.  In fact, mem-
bers of Not Dead Yet have actively opposed laws that permit
people or their surrogates to terminate life sustaining treatment
since 1983, when Elizabeth Bouvia obtained the court order that
required the hospital to remove the nasogastric tube.96
The group began its public activities in 1996 when Jack Kevor-
kian started providing assisted suicide to the public.97  In a 1997
rally, 500 people with disabilities gathered to chant “Not Dead
92 See generally Not Dead Yet, About Not Dead Yet, http://www.notdeadyet.org/
docs/about.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2006) (explaining who the group is and why it
exists).
93 Diane Coleman, Not Dead Yet, The Resistance Meets Success , MEMPHIS CTR.
FOR INDEP. LIVING, http://www.mcil.org/mcil/mcil/ndy.htm (last visited Sept. 9,
2006).
94 See, e.g., Brief for Not Dead Yet et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006) (No. 04-623) [hereinafter Gonzales  Amici
Brief]; Brief for Not Dead Yet et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Oregon
v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-35587) [hereinafter Ashcroft
Amici Brief]; Brief for Not Dead Yet et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respon-
dents, Wendland v. Wendland, 28 P.3d 151 (Cal. 2001) (No. S087265) [hereinafter
Wendland  Amici Brief]; Schiavo I  Amici Brief, supra  note 3.
95 See, e.g. , Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, http://www.dredf.org/
(last visited Sept. 14, 2006) (describing various state initiatives and explaining the
organization’s mission as “dedicated to protecting and advancing the civil rights of
people with disabilities through legislation, litigation, advocacy, technical assistance,
and education and training of attorneys, advocates, persons with disabilities, and
parents of children with disabilities”). But cf.  Press Release, Not Dead Yet, Disabil-
ity Advocates:  Texas “Futile Care” Law Should Be Euthanized, http://www.notdead
yet.org/docs/TXfutilecarelawPR0506.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2006) (calling for a
“halt to the backroom lobbying by special interest groups” related to Texas’ “futile
care” statute).
96 Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 298 (Ct. App. 1986); see supra
text accompanying notes 42-51.
97 Not Dead Yet, supra  note 92. R
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Yet” in protest of Kevorkian’s acquittal on criminal charges.98
The group’s purpose is to prevent disability discrimination in
end-of-life cases.99  It frames the issue of assisted suicide as
follows:
Though often described as compassionate, legalized medical
killing is really about a deadly double standard for people with
severe disabilities, including both conditions that are labeled
terminal and those that are not. . . . [C]ountless people with
disabilities have already died before their time.  For some, a
disabled person’s suicidal cry for help was ignored, misinter-
preted, or even exploited by the right-to-die movement.  For
others, death came at the request of a family member or other
health care surrogate.  This is not compassion, it’s
contempt.100
Working together with twenty-five national disability groups,
Not Dead Yet took on a prominent and public role during the
Schiavo  case.101  The activists claimed Terri Schiavo as one of
their own.  As the group wrote in an amicus brief:
Ms. Schiavo’s fate is intertwined with that of many people with
disabilities who must rely on surrogates.  If . . . Ms. Schiavo’s
“quality of life”—as determined by others—justifies her
death, then one cannot distinguish Ms. Schiavo from anyone
else who is “incompetent,” including thousands who cannot
speak due to developmental or physical disabilities.102
Not Dead Yet filed several amicus briefs during the course of
the Schiavo  case, all of which raised three principal arguments:
first, that the trial court had failed in its fact-finding role; second,
that Terri Schiavo had a substantive due process right to receive
treatment; and third, that the denial of medical care because of
cognitive disability constituted illegal differential treatment
under the Americans with Disabilities Act.103  The Schiavo  briefs
reiterated arguments made for years by the activists, but it was
during Schiavo  that they got the most attention.104




101 See Cerminara, supra note 5, at 154-55 (noting several public interest groups R
took part in the Schiavo  appeal).
102 Schavo I Amici Brief, supra note 3, at 4.
103 Id .  See infra Part III.A for a response to these arguments.
104 See, e.g., Diana Penner, Indiana Tackled Right-to-Die Issue in ’91:  In Schiavo-
Like Case, Parents Agonized, then Chose to Remove Tube; A Legal Battle Followed ,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 27, 2005, at 1A.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-1\ORE103.txt unknown Seq: 22 30-NOV-06 14:07
144 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85, 123
Yet actively lobbied the Florida legislature, Florida Governor
Bush, Congress, and the President on behalf of their cause.  The
results were stunning.  The lobbying effort helped to achieve
state legislation, federal and state court litigation, federal legisla-
tion, executive action, and twenty-four-hour media coverage for
weeks on end.105  Through its involvement in the case, Not Dead
Yet raised the profile of the disability rights movement and its
message to a national stage in a very real way.106  Suddenly, the
public was engaged in debates about persistent vegetative states,
advance directives, and artificial nutrition and hydration.  After
the immediate furor over Schiavo  subsided, Not Dead Yet began
supporting a Model Starvation and Dehydration of Persons with
Disabilities Prevention Act (Model Act).  The Model Act would
effectively take away the power of surrogate decisionmakers to
withhold life-sustaining treatment, especially nutrition and hy-
dration, in the absence of a written living will.107
Thus, the agenda of many disability scholars and activists is
very much the same with respect to end-of-life cases.  The two
groups appear united in their desire to prevent surrogates from
withholding treatment, especially nutrition and hydration, at the
end of a person’s life.  The community opposes such decisions
because, in its view, they are based on and perpetuate the notion
that a disabled person’s life is not worth living.  The acceptable
alternative is to educate patients and their families about the po-
tential value of life with disability, and to provide patients and
their families the support, accommodation, and tools needed to
maximize the value of that life.
After Terri Schiavo died, the new activists brought their
agenda to state legislatures across the country.  The following
Part discusses the impact of their actions.
II
HEARING THE MESSAGE:  HOW THE DISABILITY
LOBBY HAS SUCCEEDED IN CHANGING
PUBLIC DISCOURSE
For at least twenty years, certain principles have been settled
as matters of law and ethics.  First, every competent person of
105 George J. Annas, “Culture of Life” Politics at the Bedside—The Case of Terri
Schiavo , 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1710, 1711-14 (2005).
106 See Cerminara, supra note 10, at 346, 348.
107 See infra Part III.B (discussing the Model Act in detail).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-1\ORE103.txt unknown Seq: 23 30-NOV-06 14:07
2006] Disability and the End of Life 145
adult years has a qualified right to decide what to do with her
own body.108  That right, which is rooted in both constitutional
and common law, includes the right to refuse medical treat-
ment.109  Second, if a person lacks capacity to make medical deci-
sions, someone else may make medical decisions for her.110
108 See, e.g. , Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that the Consti-
tution protects the right of an individual to engage in intimate sexual conduct);
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (stating that a consti-
tutional right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment could be inferred from the
Court’s prior decisions); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (finding that the
ability of a woman to have an abortion was within the realm of personal liberty
protected by the constitution); In re  Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1990) (citing
Cruzan  for the proposition that “[a] competent individual has the constitutional
right to refuse medical treatment regardless of his or her medical condition”); In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (holding that Karen Quinlan had a federal consti-
tutional right to privacy to terminate life-sustaining treatment and that Quinlan’s
father could act on his daughter’s behalf to order removal of the ventilator that
aided her respiration).
109 See  Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 807-08 (1997) (declaring that everyone, re-
gardless of physical condition, is entitled, if competent, to refuse unwanted life-sav-
ing treatment); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 724 (1997) (same); Blouin
v. Spitzer, 356 F.3d 348, 360 (2d Cir. 2004) (same).  The importance of the right to
decline medical treatment was recently affirmed and invigorated in Sell v. United
States , 539 U.S. 166, 185-86 (2003).
110 Cruzan , 497 U.S. at 284 (noting that while a state may impose evidentiary
requirements for a guardian to make certain medical decisions, someone other than
the patient may make medical decisions for a patient); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741
P.2d 674, 682 (Ariz. 1987) (finding the right to refuse medical treatment, including
artificial nutrition and hydration, is protected under United States Constitution, Ari-
zona Constitution, and common law right to be free from bodily invasion); Barber v.
Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 486 (Ct. App. 1983) (allowing, in the first re-
ported case, withdrawal of nutrition and hydration, and holding that doctors not
criminally liable for following family’s wishes to discontinue artificial nutrition and
hydration from man in “a deeply comatose state from which he was not likely to
recover”); In re Browning , 568 So. 2d at 11 (holding that the constitutional right of
privacy embraces the right to refuse all artificial means of life support).  States have
adopted differing mechanisms to give voices to surrogates. See generally Alicia R.
Ouellette, When Vitalism Is Dead Wrong:  The Discrimination Against and Torture
of Incompetent Patients by Compulsory Life-Sustaining Treatment , 79 IND. L.J. 1, 3
n.7 (2004) (detailing the statutory provisions in each state that cover living wills,
proxies, and surrogacy).  Most states will enforce advance directives or the appoint-
ment of a health care agent. Id .  Some states automatically appoint a surrogate.
E.g ., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/1-40/65 (West 1992 & Supp. 2006).  Some states
require a surrogate decisionmaker to make decisions for the patient considering only
what is in the best interest of the patient. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4711, 4714-
4716 (West 1991 & Supp. 2006).  Other states ask the surrogate to exercise “substi-
tuted judgment,” that is, to decide what the patient would want if she could speak
for herself. E.g., MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605 (West 2002 & Supp. 2006);
Superintendent of Belchertown State. Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (Mass.
1977).  Some states have a hybrid model that allows for substituted judgment when
the patient’s wishes are known, but require a decision based on the patient’s best
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Third, the provision of nutrition and hydration to someone who
cannot eat or drink on his or her own is medical treatment, just
as the provision of air to someone who cannot breathe or insulin
to a diabetic is a medical treatment.111  Fourth, a competent indi-
vidual may voluntarily forgo life-sustaining nutrition and hydra-
tion in any state in the country.112  Fifth, the right to decline
treatment is protected in all fifty states by statutes that ensure
that a person’s wish to forgo life-sustaining treatment can be car-
ried out by a surrogate if the person loses competency.113
The Schiavo  case called all these principles into question.114
To be sure, the case did not itself result in a change in the law,
but the activism of the disability rights community and the pub-
licity the community created through Schiavo  has had “lingering
effects.”115  The most vulnerable principles concern the provision
of nutrition and hydration as medical treatment, and the ability
of a surrogate to withhold such nutrition and hydration for a per-
son who cannot speak on his or her own behalf.116  The activism
resulting from the Schiavo  case further weakened the resilience
of these principles.
Professor Tom Mayo explained, “[I]t apparently came as a sur-
prise to a lot of members of Congress and the public that ‘artifi-
cial nutrition and hydration’ (‘ANH’) is deemed to be ‘life-
sustaining treatment’ and therefore is an intervention that may
be refused on behalf of an incompetent patient . . . .”117  During
Schiavo , disability activists pressed the notion that ANH is not a
medical treatment but a fundamental human right, and legisla-
tors became open to the disability rights argument.  The disabil-
interests where the wishes are not known or knowable. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
16, § 2507 (2003 & Supp. 2004).
111 See Cruzan , 497 U.S. at 261; ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE
RIGHT TO DIE:  THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING § 6.03[G] tbl.6-2 (3d
ed. 2004 & Supp. 2006) (providing a state-by-state list of medically supplied nutri-
tion and hydration cases and attorney general opinions).
112 See Vacco , 521 U.S. at 800 (declaring that “everyone , regardless of physical
condition, is entitled, if competent, to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treat-
ment”); Cruzan , 497 U.S. at 277 (indicating that competent persons have a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment); see also
Sell , 539 U.S. at 178 (recognizing a “‘significant’ constitutionally protected ‘liberty
interest’” in avoiding forced medical treatment).
113 See  Ouellette, supra note 110, at 3 n.7 (citing living will statutes, surrogacy R
statutes, and health care proxy laws in all fifty states).
114 See Shepherd, supra note 5, at 297-301. R
115 Cerminara, supra note 5, at 158-59. R
116 See Shepherd, supra note 5, at 301. R
117 Mayo, supra note 5.
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ity rights community got additional support from the Vatican,
which came out against the removal of Terri Schiavo’s feeding
tube.118  Pope John Paul II wrote in 2004 that “[t]he administra-
tion of water and food, even when provided by artificial means,
always represents a natural way of preserving life . . . not a medi-
cal procedure.”119  Because Schiavo was brain damaged but not
brain dead, Vatican officials said she must be kept alive.
Building on the momentum of the Schiavo  case, disability ac-
tivists, together with unlikely bedfellows in the right-to-life
lobby, began pressing the Model Starvation and Dehydration of
Persons with Disabilities Prevention Act120 in state legislatures
across the country.121  The Model Act would create a presump-
tion that all people who lack the legal capacity to make their own
“health care decisions [have] directed [their] health care provid-
ers to provide . . . nutrition and hydration to a degree that is
sufficient to sustain life.”122  The presumption may be overcome
only if withholding artificial hydration and nutrition is explicitly
contemplated in the patient’s living will or if there is “clear and
convincing evidence that the person . . . gave express and in-
formed consent to [reject] nutrition or hydration in the applica-
ble circumstances.”123  Various versions of the Model Act have
been introduced as bills around the country.124
For example, a bill introduced in Kansas would make it more
difficult for guardians of the disabled to withhold nutrition and
hydration from people under their care.125  The bill, supported
expressly by Not Dead Yet President Diane Coleman, would re-
quire “legal guardians for people who are incapacitated, disabled
118 Alessio Vinci, Vatican Weighs In on Schiavo Case , CNN.COM, Mar. 23, 2005,
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/LAW/03/22/schiavo.vatican/.
119 Id. (omission in original).
120 MODEL STARVATION AND DEHYDRATION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
PREVENTION ACT (Nat’l Right to Life Comm. 2006), http://www.nrlc.org/euthanasia/
modeln&hstatelaw.pdf [hereinafter MODEL ACT].
121 Shepherd, supra note 5, 327-28 n.155. R
122 MODEL ACT, supra note 120, § 3(A). R
123 Id. § 5(A).
124 For example, versions of the Act have been proposed in Iowa, Florida, and,
according to news reports, Alabama, Hawaii, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Da-
kota.  Mayo, supra note 5; see also  Robert Tanner, Schiavo Case Spurring Statehouse
Debate , ABC NEWS, Apr. 3, 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/print?id=637522.
Some of the bills introduced are:  H.R. 701, 2005 Leg., 107th Sess. (Fla. 2005) and
H.R. 4752, 2005 Leg., 93d Sess. (Mich. 2005).
125 See  John Hanna, Schiavo Case Spurs Kansans to Action , LAWRENCE J.-
WORLD, Mar. 26, 2005, available at  http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2005/mar/26/
schiavo_case_spurs/.
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or unable to make some decisions for themselves . . . [to] obtain
permission from a judge or jury to withhold food and water if the
people in their care had no living wills . . . .”126
The disability rights community’s success in bringing attention
to its message during the Schiavo  case may affect more than the
legal treatment of nutrition and hydration.  Professor Kathy
Cerminara points to four other ways in which the Schiavo  case
may yet change laws around disability at the end of life.127  First,
legislatures may consider whether to “prevent persons who might
inherit from a patient upon that patient’s death from making de-
cisions regarding withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment.”128  This particular reform, if enacted, will affect close
family members who, many would argue, are the most appropri-
ate people to make health care decisions for incompetent
patients.129
Second, legislatures may consider whether courts must ap-
prove decisions regarding withdrawal of life-sustaining treat-
ment,130 or whether courts must appoint a guardian ad litem for
all patients who are subject to a decision to withdraw treatment.
According to Professor Cerminara, such an option, “would force
. . . families, who are already facing gut-wrenching situations, to
stake out contentious positions even more strongly than any of
them may wish; these families should instead be focusing on what
the patient would have wanted.”131
Third, legislatures might reconsider the appropriateness of the
substituted judgment standard and the use of what Norman Can-
tor calls “constructive preference” for the patient whose wishes
are not known.132  Most states allow surrogate decisionmakers to
use substituted judgment—that is, the surrogate is permitted to
126 Id.
127 Cerminara, supra  note 5, at 159-76. R
128 Id.  at 160.
129 See  Kathleen M. Boozang, An Intimate Passing:  Restoring the Role of Family
and Religion in Dying , 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 549, 585 (1997).
130 Hanna, supra note 125. R
131 Cerminara, supra note 5, at 164. R
132 Id.  at 165; see also  Allen E. Buchanan, The Limits of Proxy Decisionmaking
for Incompetents , 29 UCLA L. REV. 386, 407-08 (1981) (arguing that in substituted
judgment cases, the court should act in the incompetent’s best interests); Norman L.
Cantor, The Relation Between Autonomy-Based Rights and Profoundly Mentally
Disabled Persons , 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 37, 40 (2004) [hereinafter Cantor, Auton-
omy-Based Rights]; Norman L. Cantor, Twenty-Five Years After Quinlan:  A Review
of the Jurisprudence of Death and Dying , 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 182, 192-93 (2001)
(discussing the “constructive preference” surrogate decisionmaking standard).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-1\ORE103.txt unknown Seq: 27 30-NOV-06 14:07
2006] Disability and the End of Life 149
determine what the patient would have wanted had she been
able to decide for herself.133  The standard does not require writ-
ten evidence of the patient’s wishes.134  Rather, the surrogate can
make the determination based upon the patient’s values, beliefs,
and past choices.135  In some cases, the patient has never had the
ability to express wishes for end-of-life medical care, or to form
values or beliefs that would have shaped the decision.  In such
cases, surrogates are “actually determining a ‘constructive prefer-
ence’ for the patient—‘imputing choices to a formerly competent
patient based on what the vast majority of competent persons
would want done for themselves in the circumstances at
hand.’”136  Because most people favor termination of treatment
in cases where they must “exist in a non-communicative state or
a state in which they manifest little or no control over their sur-
roundings or recognition or enjoyment of loved ones,”137 a
scheme allowing a decisionmaker to act on constructive prefer-
ence will allow the termination of treatment in more cases than
not.  The mid-level appellate court in Schiavo  expressly stated
that use of the majority view was inappropriate in conducting a
substituted judgment analysis.138  The Model Act shopped in
Schiavo ’s wake would prohibit the use of constructive preference
and substituted judgment altogether.
Finally, the case may trigger change in the way legislatures
treat people in persistent vegetative states (PVS).  Because Schi-
avo  drew attention to the somewhat incongruous fact that some-
one in a PVS can appear awake and able to react to certain
stimuli, legislatures could decide to revisit statutory definitions of
a PVS, or, more alarmingly, revisit laws that allow the termina-
tion of treatment for a person in a PVS.139  For example, Lois
Shepherd describes a bill that is pending in Ohio as making it
“even more likely that the preferences for treatment withdrawal
133 See  Ouellette, supra note 110, 48-55 app. (charting laws in all fifty states and R
revealing that substituted judgment is the majority model).
134 “The substituted judgment standard has subjective and objective components.
Through this standard, the surrogate attempts to ascertain, with as much specificity
as possible, the decision the incompetent patient would make if he were competent
to do so.”  Martin v. Martin (In re Martin), 538 N.W.2d 399, 407 (Mich. 1995).
135 See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 111, § 4.02.
136 Cerminara, supra note 5, at 165. R
137 Id.  at 166 (citing Robert A. Pearlman, Insights Pertaining to Patient Assess-
ments of States Worse than Death, 4 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 33 (1993)).
138 Cerminara, supra note 5, at 166. R
139 Id.  at 176-77.
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of a person in a permanent vegetative state would be ignored.”140
The law would make the surrogacy process that ordinarily applies
to patients who lack decisionmaking capacity inapplicable for pa-
tients in persistent vegetative states if someone who could poten-
tially serve as a surrogate agreed in writing not to withdraw
artificial nutrition and hydration.  That person would be given
the power over the patient regardless of what the patient might
have wanted.  The bill’s effect would be “to nullify a patient’s
wishes to discontinue tube feeding by deferring to a surrogate
who determined otherwise.”141
The impact of the new advocacy will not be known for some
time.  In the meantime, a critical examination of both the agenda
and its underlying theory is in order.
III
DANGER, CONFLATION, MISIDENTIFICATION, AND
PERNICIOUS PATERNALISM
The new advocacy by the disability rights community on end-
of-life cases is theoretically flawed and dangerous.  The commu-
nity advocates laws that would make it virtually impossible for
surrogates to terminate life-sustaining treatment for people who
lack capacity and have no living will.142  The community argues
that such legislation is necessary to protect the disabled from dis-
crimination that will force early death because of the judgment
that disabled lives are not worth living.143
Before the new advocacy took center stage in the disability
rights movement, paternalism was the enemy of the commu-
nity.  Disability rights activist James Charlton explained,
140 Shepherd, supra  note 5, at 318-19 & n.11 (citing H.R. 201, 126th Gen. Assem., R
Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005), and noting that as of January 7, 2006, the Bill remained in
committee).
141 Id.
142 See, e.g. , NCIL Position Statement, supra note 4 (supporting legislation “that
restores and maintains restrictions on surrogate decisions for withholding of food
and water via tube”); CHP Position Statement, supra  note 4 (stating that for those
lacking capacity and a directive, “treatment should not be withheld or withdrawn
unless death is genuinely imminent” or continued care “is objectively futile”).  The
exception that would allow termination of treatment if so requested in a living will
reflects one of two things:  respect for unambiguous statements of precedent auton-
omy, or, more cynically, a resigned acceptance that contesting the use of living wills
is a losing cause.  I suspect the latter.  The theory behind the community’s message
against termination of treatment for people without living wills applies with the
same force to living wills as it does to other methods of medical decisionmaking.
143 See supra Part II.
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“[p]aternalism lies at the center of the oppression of people with
disabilities.  Paternalism starts with the notion of superiority:  We
must and can control these ‘subjects’ in spite of themselves, in
spite of their individual will, or culture and tradition.”144  The
new activists have focused on a new enemy—people who favor
autonomy as the paramount concern in medical decisionmaking.
Thus, a new activist charged, “If I were listing the most danger-
ous people in the U.S. today, bioethicists, aka medical ethicists,
would top my list—way above skinheads, whose beliefs they ap-
pear to share.”145
How did the new activists stray so far from their roots in disa-
bility studies that they began pushing paternalistic laws that
would disable individuals already facing disability?  Kathy
Cerminara argues that right-to-life advocates have co-opted the
disability agenda.146  I disagree, at least in part.  While the inter-
ests and activism of the two groups converged as early as 1983147
with respect to the Baby Doe cases,148 the new agenda is the nat-
ural outgrowth of disability studies and identity politics.
Disability studies reframed common problems faced by people
with physical and cognitive impairments as disability issues and
brought together a diverse group that rallied together to become
a political force.  The activists, consisting of people with a wide
array of physical impairments, joined together in a struggle based
on the shared experience of injustice.  The larger the group, the
greater its power.  The more universalized its agenda, the greater
its impact.  Thus, while the activists’ purported goal, like that of
their scholarly counterparts, is greater self-determination and the
elimination of social obstacles to success for their constituents,
their agenda relies on the recognition of disability as a political
force.  The cohesion of the group paid off, in a classic example of
the power of identity politics, with the passage of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA).
The group’s focus on a universal answer to end-of-life deci-
sionmaking, however, is not a victory for its members.  The new
144 CHARLTON, supra note 21, at 54-55.
145 Kuczewski, supra  note 10, at 36 (quoting Alice Mailhot, Bioethics:  Introduc-
tion to Theories from Hell , MOUTH MAG., 1994, available at  www.notdeadyet.org/
bioethic.html).
146 Cerminara, supra note 10, at 370-84.
147 See  Asch, supra  note 2, at 303. R
148 E.g. , Infant Doe v. Bloomington Hosp., 464 U.S. 961 (1983) (denying
certiorari).
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activists’ agenda around end-of-life decisionmaking is plagued by
paternalism that marks a departure from the scholarly focus on
the importance of self-determination for people with disabilities.
In this Part, I argue that the disability activists’ flawed agenda
with respect to end-of-life decisionmaking is the result of the mis-
use of identity politics.149  That is, the activists’ single-minded fo-
cus on disability, their need to claim all impaired persons as
disabled, their effort to reframe all end-of-life cases as disability
issues, and their claim of self determination for the community
regardless of its impact on individual members have led the
group to its current posture—that of asserting that there is one
single answer to disability.
The position taken by the disability activists is not only analyti-
cally flawed, it is also dangerous.  If adopted, the laws they advo-
cate would themselves discriminate against the disabled by
making it impossible for anyone who lacks capacity—itself a kind
of disability—from having access to a medically appropriate
treatment.  The result would not only physically hurt people, it
would have the ironic effect of disabling the disabled.
I start by dispensing with the legal arguments advanced by Not
Dead Yet and others that laws that allow surrogates to choose to
withdraw life-sustaining treatment legally discriminate against
the disabled.  I then address the advocate’s proposed legislation,
and show how adoption of laws based on their model legislation
would hurt all of us, especially those with disabilities.  Finally, I
explore the theoretical flaws—conflation, misidentification, so-
cial kinship, and assumption—that led the activists to their ex-
treme positions.
A. Legal Flaws, Medical Errors, and Discriminatory Effect
The legal arguments pressed by the new activists in cases like
Schiavo  are easily dismissed.  The principle underlying the argu-
ments is that laws that allow surrogates to choose to withdraw or
withhold treatment at the end of life violate the ADA and the
due process rights of persons with disabilities.150
149 Identity politics is “the mobilization around gender, racial, and similar group-
based categories in order to shape or alter the exercise of power to benefit group
members.”  Martha Minow, Not Only for Myself:  Identity, Politics, and Law , 75 OR.
L. REV. 647, 648 (1996).
150 See Gonzales  Amici Brief, supra  note 94, at 10; Ashcroft  Amici Brief, supra
note 94; Wendland  Amici Brief, supra  note 94; Schiavo I  Amici Brief, supra  note 3.
To be sure, the activists also challenged factual determinations in the individual
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1. Americans with Disabilities Act
The new activists argue that allowing a surrogate like Michael
Schiavo to deny food and water to someone who is too disabled
to make her own health care decisions is disability discrimination
that violates the ADA.151
The purpose of the ADA was to “provide a clear and compre-
hensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities.”152  The ADA offers broader
protection against disability discrimination than the protection
provided by other federal laws.153  The ADA provides that “[n]o
individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability
in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation . . . .”154  The ADA also forbids “utilizing stan-
dards, criteria, or methods of administration that have the effect
of discrimination on the basis of disability.”155  Medical care
clearly falls under the ADA’s operation.156
Families of people with disabilities and disability rights activ-
ists have successfully turned to the ADA to force health care
providers to treat people with disabilities.157  They have con-
cases, such as the finding that Terri Schiavo was in a persistent vegetative state and
that there was clear and convincing evidence of her wishes. See Schiavo I  Amici
Brief, supra  note 3.  Those case-specific challenges are less important than the
broader claims of disability discrimination that, if successful, would undermine basic
legal principles of medical decisionmaking in future cases.
151 See Schiavo I  Amici Brief, supra  note 3.
152 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000).
153 Two federal statutes protect people with disabilities from improper discrimina-
tion.  Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides that “[n]o otherwise
qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability,
be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance
. . . .”  29 U.S.C. § 794(a).  The ADA’s coverage is broader, applying to disability-
based discrimination by employers and public accommodations such as doctor’s of-
fices and hospitals.  42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12181(7), 12182.
154 42 U.S.C. § 12182.
155 Id. § 12112(b)(3)(A).
156 See, e.g. , Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (applying ADA in medical
treatment case involving a dentist).
157 The most significant victory came not from the courts, but from a decision by
the Health and Human Services Secretary to block the Oregon health care rationing
plan on grounds it would violate the antidiscrimination laws.  Letter from Louis W.
Sullivan, Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., to Barbara Roberts, Governor of Or.
(August 3, 1992) (with accompanying three-page “Analysis Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) of the Oregon Reform Demonstration”), reprinted in
ADA Analyses of the Oregon Health Care Plan , 9 ISSUES L. & MED. 397, 409-12
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-1\ORE103.txt unknown Seq: 32 30-NOV-06 14:07
154 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85, 123
vinced courts that when the family or the patient’s surrogate has
consented to the care, a disabled person is entitled to all the
medical care that would be provided to a nondisabled person.158
A refusal by a medical provider to honor a request for treatment
can constitute discrimination under the ADA.159  Thus, an HIV-
infected woman successfully sued under the ADA to force a den-
tist to fill her cavity in his office instead of in the hospital,160 and
the mother of an anencephalic infant was able to use the ADA to
(1994).  The advocates have also had some court victories. See, e.g. , Henderson v.
Bodine Aluminum, Inc., 70 F.3d 958, 960 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding in a case of an
insurance denial for a bone marrow treatment that “if the evidence shows that a
given treatment is non-experimental—that is, if it is widespread, safe, and a signifi-
cant improvement on traditional therapies—and the plan provides the treatment for
other conditions directly comparable to the one at issue, the denial of that treatment
arguably violates the ADA”); Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s
Ass’n of New Eng., Inc., 37 F.3d 1216 (1st Cir. 1994) (applying ADA to denial of
health coverage by employer health plan); In re  Baby “K,” 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1028-
29 (E.D. Va. 1993) (requiring hospital to provide life support to anencephalic
infant).
158 E.g. , In re Baby “K,”  832 F. Supp. at 1028-29.
159 The refusal by a medical provider to give treatment demanded by a patient or
a patient’s surrogate raises tough questions under the ADA that are not addressed
in this Article.  This Article focuses on the specific issue of disability activists’ cru-
sade to limit the ability of a patient’s surrogate to forgo treatment.  For further dis-
cussion of the role of the ADA in cases where demanded care is refused, see Mary
Crossley, Becoming Visible:  The ADA’s Impact on Health Care for Persons with
Disabilities , 52 ALA. L. REV. 51, 57-68 (2000) (recognizing the ADA’s possible ap-
plication in cases in which an individual is denied care that she sought, and discuss-
ing the limits of a statute’s applicability in rationing schemes) and Maxwell J.
Mehlman et al., When Do Health Care Decisions Discriminate Against Persons with
Disabilities?, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1385 (1997) (distinguishing the difficult
question of the ADA’s application to medical treatment decisions made by provid-
ers when a patient or patient’s legally authorized representative declines treatment).
The application of the ADA in cases when providers refuse care due to futility, or
where rationing schemes make care inaccessible, are legally distinct from the one
posed by the new activists in Schiavo . See  Crossley, supra , at 75-77 (discussing Ore-
gon’s rationing scheme); Mary A. Crossley, Medical Futility and Disability Discrimi-
nation , 81 IOWA L. REV. 179, 202-50 (1995) (arguing that the ADA is an inadequate
tool for analyzing the merits of futility policies); Mehlman et al., supra , at 1389-92
(1997) (discussing futility disputes); David Orentlicher, Rationing and the Americans
with Disabilities Act , 271 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 308 (1994); Philip G. Peters, Jr., Health
Care Rationing and Disability Rights , 70 IND. L.J. 491, 492 (1995) (considering how
rationing “can be legally and ethically defended by proof that the excluded treat-
ments are less effective than those which are provided”); Philip G. Peters, Jr., When
Physicians Balk at Futile Care:  Implications of the Disability Rights Laws , 91 NW. U.
L. REV. 798, 810-19 (1997) (discussing futility disputes); James V. Garvey, Note,
Health Care Rationing and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990:  What Protec-
tion Should the Disabled Be Afforded? , 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 581, 601-02, 613-16
(1993) (evaluating the Oregon Health Plan’s compatability with the ADA).
160 Bragdon , 524 U.S. at 648-54.
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force a hospital to keep her baby alive through ventilation.161
The courts in these cases reasoned that treatment available to the
nondisabled must be available to the disabled.162
Applying this reasoning in the case of Terri Schiavo, Not Dead
Yet argued that removing Terri Schiavo’s feeding tube would
deny Schiavo the care that would be provided to people without
disabilities because people without her disability would be pro-
vided nutrition and hydration.163  Specifically, the group’s amicus
brief to the Florida District Court of Appeal in In re Schiavo
argues:
Treating people differently based on health or disability status
violates the rights of people with disabilities under the ADA.
Absent proof that it is truly the person’s decision, withholding
medical care based on the belief that he or she would ration-
ally want to die because of a disability is discriminatory.  . . .
When health care providers deny people with severe cognitive
disabilities the health care they need to live, but do not do so
for others, they violate Title III of the ADA, governing health
care providers and other “public accommodations.”  When
state and local governments establish laws and policies that
deprive people with cognitive disabilities of the care granted
to “competent” persons, they violate Title II of the ADA.164
The argument fails for several reasons.  First, it wrongly as-
sumes that Terri Schiavo was denied care that she would other-
wise have received because of her disability.  She was not.  Terri
Schiavo could not receive the care because no one with authority
to authorize the continuation of artificial nutrition and hydration
had consented to it.  The United States Supreme Court decided
the issue in Bowen v. American Hospital Association .165  There,
the Court was asked whether the Rehabilitation Act prohibited
the withholding of medical treatment to handicapped infants.166
The Supreme Court found no evidence that the hospitals had de-
nied treatment on the basis of handicap.167  Rather, treatment
was denied because of the absence of parental consent.168  Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court concluded, “A hospital’s withhold-
ing of treatment [from a handicapped infant] when no parental
161 In re Baby “K,”  832 F. Supp. at 1028-29.
162 See id.  at 1029.
163 Schiavo I Amici Brief, supra  note 3.
164 Id.  at 19.
165 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
166 Id.  at 612.
167 See id.  at 630.
168 Id. at 630-31.
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consent has been given cannot violate [the Rehabilitation Act],
for without the consent of the parents . . . the infant is neither
‘otherwise qualified’ for treatment nor has he been denied care
‘solely by reason of his handicap.’”169
The Court’s reasoning in Bowen  applies equally in the case of
Terri Schiavo.  The case had nothing to do with disability discrim-
ination.  A hospital cannot administer medical treatment in the
absence of a patient’s consent or consent by a legal surrogate
because without consent, the patient is not qualified to receive
treatment.  Under Florida law, Michael Schiavo was Terri Schi-
avo’s legal surrogate.  His refusal to consent to treatment on
Terri Schiavo’s behalf disqualified her for treatment and pro-
vided her physicians a reason to withdraw her treatment other
than her disability.170  Thus, Schiavo  was not a case about treat-
ment refusal based on disability.
Secondly, the laws that gave Michael Schiavo the power to re-
fuse treatment for his wife do not discriminate against people
with disabilities; those laws give people with disabilities, like
Terri Schiavo, a voice in their medical decisionmaking.  Laws that
give surrogates the power to make medical decisions are not
analogous to a dentist’s refusal to fill a cavity for an AIDS pa-
tient in a dentist’s office.171  Whereas the dentist’s refusal to fill a
cavity constituted denial of access to appropriate medical care,172
the Florida surrogacy laws provided Terri Schiavo with access to
medically appropriate options, including the option to refuse
treatment.173
169 Id.  at 630; see also  United States v. Univ. Hosp. State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony
Brook, 729 F.2d 144, 161 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the Rehabilitation Act did not
authorize government intervention overriding the private decision of parents to re-
fuse consent to corrective surgery for a child born with spina bifida and hydrocepha-
lus).  Title III of the ADA does not contain the “otherwise qualified” language in
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
170 The real issues in the case were whether Michael Schiavo should be disquali-
fied as a guardian and, if not, whether he had proved what Terri’s wishes were by
clear and convincing evidence.
171 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
172 See id. at 641. The dentist did not argue that his desire to treat the patient in a
hospital rather than a dentist’s office was medically appropriate for the patient.  The
dentist argued that the option was permissible under the harm exception to the
ADA. See id. at 648.
173 Obviously, the ADA does not prohibit medical treatment that is appropriate
because of a patient’s disability.  As the First Circuit Court of Appeals noted:
[S]uch a prohibition would not only be nonsensical; it would be unethical.
. . . “Ethical medical decisionmaking should take into account all medical
factors—disability-related or not—affecting a patient’s condition and prog-
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Terminating treatment is part of good palliative care prac-
tice.174  Like a decision to provide pain-relieving drugs despite
the fact that they might hasten death, a decision to terminate
treatment may be made to increase patient comfort, to eliminate
pain, or to stop bodily deterioration.175  The decision might also
be made to implement the patient’s own judgment about life in
her current state.  In any of these cases, standard medical care
offers all adults the option to choose whether to terminate
treatment.
Furthermore, people choose to terminate treatment in hospi-
tals every day.  Jehovah’s Witnesses refuse blood transfusions.
Cancer patients refuse chemotherapy.  People in persistent vege-
tative states refuse nutrition and hydration through advance di-
rectives.  Since Terri Schiavo had no advance directive and could
not make her own health care decisions, she could access treat-
ment options solely through her surrogate.  Thus, the law that
gave Michael Schiavo power to make medical decisions in Terri’s
stead gave Terri access to appropriate medical care.
Not Dead Yet’s argument turns the ADA on its head.  Laws
that give people with disabilities access to choice between medi-
cally acceptable treatments protect the rights of people with disa-
bilities—even if one of the choices is the termination of
treatment.  It is the denial of access to all available options that
nosis.  Thus, to read the ADA as prohibiting a medical decision-maker
from considering medical factors flowing from a disability would put the
disabled patient . . . in a different, arguably worse, position than the nondis-
abled patient.”
Lesley v. Chie, 250 F.3d 47, 53 n.6 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting Mary A. Crossley, Of
Diagnoses and Discrimination:  Discriminatory Nontreatment of Infants with HIV In-
fection , 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1581, 1655 (1993)).
174 See BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, WITHHOLDING AND WITHDRAWING
LIFE-PROLONGING MEDICAL TREATMENT:  GUIDANCE FOR DECISION MAKING
(2001); Frank D. Ferris et al., Ensuring Competency in End-of-Life Care:  Control-
ling Symptoms , BMC PALLIATIVE CARE, July 30, 2002, at 10, http://www.biomed
central.com/content/pdf/1472-684X-1-5.pdf (“[M]ost experts feel that dehydration in
the last hours of living does not cause distress and may stimulate the release of
endorphins . . . .”); Robert M. McCann et al., Comfort Care for Terminally Ill Pa-
tients:  The Appropriate Use of Nutrition and Hydration , 272 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
1263, 1265-66 (1994) (recognizing that providing nutrition and hydration to termi-
nally ill patients can cause unwanted and painful side effects and finding that termi-
nating the treatment increases patient comfort); Robert J. Sullivan, Jr., Accepting
Death Without Artificial Nutrition or Hydration , 8 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 220, 222
(1993) (“[I]t is likely that prolonged dehydration and starvation induce no pain and
only limited discomfort . . . .”).
175 See Ouellette, supra note 110, at 34, for further discussion on how the option R
to terminate treatment is essential to palliative care.
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would violate the ADA.  In fact, surrogacy laws ensure that the
ADA’s demand for access is fulfilled.  Substituted-judgment and
best-interests based statutes are reasonable accommodations.
They give the people who lack competence to make their own
health care decisions access to the same options available to
those who have competence.  In this way, surrogacy statutes can
be compared to access ramps installed by building owners after
the passage of the ADA.  Just as ramps were not the equivalent
to stairs (e.g., they might be located in the back of the building
and take longer to traverse than stairs), surrogacy laws are not
the equivalent to an actual exercise of medical decisionmaking by
the disabled person.  However, just like ramps allow the person
with the disability to get into a building, surrogacy laws allow the
patient access to all appropriate treatment decisions, including
no treatment at all.
So long as a surrogate is choosing between medically accept-
able options, the ADA has no role in a medical decisionmaking
case.  Palliative care medicine views the termination of treat-
ment, including the withholding of nutrition and hydration, as
medically appropriate when a person is terminally ill or perma-
nently unconscious.  Like dental treatment, palliative care is a
public accommodation available to the general public.  The activ-
ists’ position would limit options for surrogates and thereby deny
people who lack the capacity access to an acceptable option in
palliative care, thus denying the disabled a public accommoda-
tion.  The denial of access would be based on the patient’s disa-
bility:  the inability to form or express intent.
If the disability activists are right, and the ADA prohibits deci-
sions to terminate treatment for people who cannot speak for
themselves, then the ADA would prohibit the disabled from re-
ceiving appropriate palliative care.176  The ADA should not be
used to keep people with disabilities from accessing any medical
choice.  If it is applicable to end-of-life decisions at all, the ADA
should ensure that people with disabilities have the same access
to palliative care as all other patients.177
2. Due Process
Not Dead Yet’s argument that laws that allow the termination
of treatment violate patients’ due process rights is even less com-
176 See id. at 43.
177 Id.
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pelling than its discrimination argument.  Not Dead Yet argues
that the Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Depart-
ment of Health178 specifically held that a patient’s due process
right to life is violated by allowing surrogates to make decisions
to withhold treatment on anything less than “clear and convinc-
ing” evidence that the patient expressed the wish to terminate
treatment.179  The argument misconstrues the Supreme Court’s
Cruzan  decision.
Nancy Cruzan was in a persistent vegetative state because of
injuries she sustained during an automobile accident.180  Her par-
ents sought a court order directing the withdrawal of life-sus-
taining nutrition and hydration.  The Supreme Court of Missouri
held that her parents lacked the authority to make the decision
because they could not produce clear and convincing evidence
that Cruzan would have wanted to terminate treatment.181  The
Supreme Court “granted certiorari to consider the question
whether Cruzan has a right under the United States Constitution
that would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treat-
ment from her under these circumstances.”182
The Court carefully and narrowly defined the issue as whether
Missouri’s clear and convincing evidence standard infringed
upon Nancy Cruzan’s due process rights to refuse life-saving
treatment.183  The Court upheld the Missouri statute, explaining
that when a patient is incompetent to assert her own wishes, “a
State may properly decline to make judgments about the ‘qual-
ity’ of life that a particular individual may enjoy, and simply as-
sert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life.”184
Thus, the Court held that the Due Process Clause does not re-
quire the state to repose judgment with anyone but the patient
herself on what is an acceptable quality of life.185
Contrary to Not Dead Yet’s interpretation of Cruzan , nothing
178 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
179 See  Brief of Amici Curiae Not Dead Yet et al. Supporting Appellant, Bush v.
Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004) (No. SC04-925), reprinted in 20 ISSUES L. &
MED. 171, 176-79 (2004).  The group pressed this argument in the context of the
Schiavo case, despite the fact that Florida’s law required proof by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. Bush , 885 So. 2d at 335 & n.4.
180 Cruzan , 497 U.S. at 265.
181 Id.
182 Id.  at 269.
183 See id.  at 280 (majority opinion); id. at  292 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
184 Id.  at 282 (majority opinion).
185 Id.  at 285-86.
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in the decision remotely suggests that Missouri’s high evidentiary
standard is constitutionally required.  The Court simply upheld
Missouri’s law as one acceptable state alternative.186  In fact, Jus-
tice O’Connor explained in her concurrence that the Court’s de-
cision was “only that one State’s practice does not violate the
Constitution; the more challenging task of crafting appropriate
procedures for safeguarding incompetents’ liberty interests is en-
trusted to the ‘laboratory’ of the States, in the first instance.”187
Thus, other states have latitude to adopt schemes that differ from
Missouri’s, including ones that allow surrogates to make deci-
sions on less than clear and convincing evidence.188
To be sure, Cruzan  would permit the limitations on surrogate
decisionmaking that Not Dead Yet and its fellow amici (several
disability rights groups joined the brief) sought in the Schiavo
case.189  What is curious, however, is that the activists oppose
more generous surrogacy statutes that actually protect the due
process rights of people with severe disabilities.  Like all citizens,
people with severe disabilities have the due process right to re-
fuse medical treatment.  Norman Cantor identifies three compo-
nents of that right:  “(1) an interest in self-determination (i.e., in
making a choice about treatment); (2) an interest in well-being
(i.e., in having net interests advanced by a decision about treat-
ment); and (3) an interest in maintenance of bodily integrity (i.e.,
freedom from unnecessary bodily invasion).”190  A well-intended
surrogate is the best person to exercise the disabled patient’s
right to well-being and maintenance of bodily integrity.  Al-
though a surrogate cannot exercise a profoundly disabled per-
son’s right to self determination, “[a] conscientious surrogate can
determine whether medical intervention will promote the well-
being or net interests of a profoundly disabled patient and
whether the patient’s bodily integrity or dignity will be needlessly
compromised by the contemplated medical procedure.”191
186 See id.  at 286-87.
187 Id.  at 292 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
188 See  Ouellette, supra note 110, at 48-55 app. (charting laws in every state and R
revealing that more than half use a substituted judgment approach).
189 It is worth noting, moreover, that Florida law provided Schiavo the protection
of the clear and convincing evidence standard. Id. at 49 app. (citing FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 765.401(3) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003)).
190 Cantor, Autonomy-Based Rights , supra note 132, at 43-44. R
191 Id.  at 44. It is possible, moreover, that the Constitution provides a right to
pain control, and the avoidance of medically inappropriate care. See  Ouellette,
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Disability activists fear that no surrogate is conscientious, and
that no surrogate can be trusted to make a decision to refuse
treatment for reasons other than fear of disability.  Thus, out of
fear that surrogate decisionmaking could be abused, disability ac-
tivists would create a right to life that would prevent surrogates
from exercising an independent judgment for an individual pa-
tient about a particular person’s well-being and bodily integrity.
If adopted, the position could have serious negative conse-
quences for anyone who has not issued an advance directive.
B. Danger:  Substituted Judgment for Everyone
The legislative agenda being pushed by the new activists is bla-
tantly paternalistic.  Its purpose is to protect disabled patients.  In
effect, the activists are saying that individuals, their families, and
their physicians cannot be allowed to make their own decisions,
because people without disabilities cannot and do not understand
and accept that life with disability can be a life with quality.
Therefore, to protect people with disabilities, the new activists
would take certain choices out of the hands of people without
disabilities.  This Part argues that adopting the agenda would not
protect the disabled—it would harm them.
Major disability rights groups have adopted common resolu-
tions that set forth the new activists’ agenda.  That agenda fo-
cuses on the power of surrogates to withhold nutrition and
hydration, and could easily apply to any life-sustaining treatment.
The legislation the new activists are proposing would essentially
eliminate the ability of surrogates to use substituted judgment as
a model for decisionmaking and impose, instead, the activists’
judgment that continued life is the appropriate course.  For ex-
ample, the National Council for Independent Living has resolved
to advocate for legislation that would “only allow for withholding
of food and water in the presence of ‘clear and convincing evi-
dence’ of the person’s wishes or when the person’s medical con-
dition renders them incapable of digesting or absorbing the
nutrition and hydration so that its provision would not contribute
supra note 110 at 32-36 & nn.203-04 (citing Robert A. Burt, The Supreme Court R
Speaks:  Not Assisted Suicide but a Constitutional Right to Palliative Care , 337 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1234, 1234 (1997), and Alan Meisel, Pharmacists, Physician-Assisted
Suicide, and Pain Control , 2 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 211, 214-15 (1999)).
Neither the right to pain control nor the avoidance of medically inappropriate care
was at issue in Schiavo .  Schiavo could feel no pain, and providing treatment was not
inappropriate.
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to sustaining the person’s life.”192
The Model Starvation and Dehydration of Persons with Disa-
bilities Prevention Act specifically imposes a presumption “that
every person legally incapable of making health care decisions
has directed his or her health care providers to provide him or
her with nutrition and hydration to a degree that is sufficient to
sustain life.”193  Thus, the Model Act expressly imposes a substi-
tuted judgment about what the person would want, regardless of
the individual’s values.  The presumption could be overcome in
very limited circumstances.  “No guardian, surrogate, public or
private agency, court, or any other person” would have the au-
thority to terminate nutrition and hydration except if expressly
provided for in a living will, or if the surrogate could produce
“clear and convincing evidence that the person . . . , when legally
capable of making health care decisions, gave express and in-
formed consent to withdrawing or withholding hydration or nu-
trition in the applicable circumstances,” or if the nutrition and
hydration is not medically possible, would hasten death, or would
not contribute to sustaining the person’s life.194
The Model Act and the resolutions of various disabilities
groups would impose laws very much like New York’s.195  New
York is one of three states that severely limits the ability of fam-
ily members to refuse life-sustaining treatment for patients who
lack competence to make their own decisions in the absence of
an advance directive.196
New York law, much like the law proposed by the Model Act,
192 NCIL Position Statement, supra  note 4 (emphasis added). See also CHP Posi-
tion Statement, supra  note 4 (“Absent clear and convincing evidence of the desires
of people with disabilities to decline life-sustaining care or treatment, such care or
treatment should not be withheld or withdrawn unless death is genuinely imminent
and the care or treatment is objectively futile and would only prolong the dying
process.”).
193 MODEL ACT, supra  note 120, § 3(A).
194 Id. §§ 3(B), 5(A).
195 New York has carved out a small exception to its vitalist laws because of the
tragic case of Sheila Pouliot. See Blouin v. Spitzer, 356 F.3d 348 (2d Cir. 2004).  The
Health Care Act for Persons with Mental Retardation sets up the only available
mechanism to terminate life-sustaining treatment for a person who has never had
decisionmaking capacity. See N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT LAW § 1750-b (McKinney
Supp. 2003) (allowing surrogate of person with mental retardation to terminate
treatment).  This statutory exception, by definition, does not apply to people inca-
pacitated by brain injury, mental illness, minority, or other physical illness. Id.
196 Along with New York, Michigan and Missouri also severely limit family mem-
bers’ ability to refuse life-sustaining treatment for people who lack decisionmaking
capacity and have no living will. See  Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S.
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makes it nearly impossible for the family of a person who lacks
decisionmaking capacity to forgo life-sustaining treatment in the
absence of a living will.197  Under New York common law, a “pa-
tient alone had the right to decide on terminating life support
systems.”198  Consistent with the personal nature of this right, the
New York Court of Appeals took note of the “fundamental com-
mitment to the notion that no person or court should substitute
its judgment as to what would be an acceptable quality of life for
another.”199  New York does not allow a third party to terminate
life-sustaining sustenance for a person who has not stated a “spe-
cific subjective intent”200 to forgo such treatment under the spe-
cific circumstances presented, a requirement that is so strict that
it is almost never satisfied absent a written directive.201  The rule
applies with particular force to nutrition and hydration by
prohibiting parents and guardians from making a “decision that
would result in [the incompetent patient] starving to death, if
such could be medically avoided, regardless of how soon he may
or may not succumb from other causes.”202
261, 285-86 (1990); Martin v. Martin (In re  Martin), 538 N.W.2d 399, 413 (Mich.
1995).
197 See  Blouin v. Spitzer, 213 F. Supp. 2d 184, 193 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (“New York
law does not allow a third party to decide that the quality of life of another has
declined to a point where treatment should be withheld and the patient should be
allowed to die.”), aff’d , 356 F.3d 348 (2d Cir. 2004); In re  Westchester County Med.
Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y. 1988).  New York’s protection of life yields to the
express exercise of autonomy, except in cases involving cardiopulmonary resuscita-
tion and for people with mental retardation.  In all other cases, the general rule
requiring treatment applies. See  § 1750-b.
198 Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc. v. Elbaum, 623 N.E.2d 513, 515 (N.Y. 1993).
199 In re Westchester County Med. Ctr. , 531 N.E.2d at 613.
200 Hancock, supra note 68, at 652 (citing In re Westchester County Med. Ctr. , 531
N.E.2d at 613).
201 In re Westchester County Med. Ctr. , 531 N.E.2d at 608 (rejecting patient’s
statements that she would not like to live like a vegetable or be a burden on her
family as insufficient to show clear and convincing evidence of her wishes).
202 In re Matthews, 650 N.Y.S.2d 373, 377 (App. Div. 1996).  As I have noted in a
previous article:
New York’s policy prohibiting third-party decisions to withhold life-
sustaining treatment where the patient’s wishes are not known or knowable
is reflected in statute.  In 1985, the legislature enacted Mental Hygiene Law
Article 80, providing for “surrogate decision-making committees” to make
health care decisions for incompetent residents of mental hygiene facilities
who need “major medical treatment” and do not have family members,
guardians, committees or conservators available to make those decisions.
The types of “major medical treatment” within a committee’s purview were
explicitly defined to exclude “nutrition or . . . the withdrawal or discontinu-
ance of medical treatment which is sustaining life functions.”
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Some patients, such as the profoundly retarded, the mentally
ill, and those born with brain injuries, have never had the ability
to express a specific subjective intention.  Others simply did not
express a specific subjective intention prior to becoming incapac-
itated.  As to both groups, the Model Act and the resolutions
similar to New York’s law203 would require that life-sustaining
treatment be provided.
The so-called protection afforded the disabled by the New
York law and in the law sought by the new activists is dangerous.
As discussed in Part II, eliminating choices available to surro-
gates will prevent people with profound disabilities from gaining
full access to palliative care.  Such limitations may very well vio-
late the ADA.  The limitations will, moreover, remove from the
equation the disabled patient’s right to bodily integrity and free-
dom from restraint.  The experiences with such laws by disabled
people in New York stand as cautionary tales to those who would
spread them throughout the country.
1. Two Cautionary Tales
Two cases exemplify the problem with paternalistic laws like
those being advocated by Not Dead Yet.  Both cases arise in New
York.  The use of New York cases is appropriate because the new
activists and disability scholars look to New York law as appro-
priately protecting the rights of the disabled through their strict
limitations on surrogate decisionmaking.204
Sheila Pouliot lived almost her entire life with severe disabili-
ties and died after being subjected to New York’s laws at age
forty-two.205  Her story, which I have written about before, bears
repeating because it stands as a terrible lesson about the cost to
people with disabilities exacted by paternalistic laws.  Contrasted
to her story is that of Scott Matthews, another person at the
center of a controversy over the imposition of a feeding tube.
The two stories demonstrate persuasively the danger of paternal-
Ouellette, supra note 110, at 23 (footnotes omitted). R
203 See  Blouin v. Spitzer, 213 F. Supp. 2d 184, 193 (N.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d , 356 F.3d
348 (2d Cir. 2004); In re Westchester County Med. Ctr. , 531 N.E.2d at 613.
204 See supra Part II.B.
205 For more information on the case of Shelia Pouliot, see Blouin v. Spitzer, 356
F.3d 348, 354-56 (2d Cir. 2004); Michael P. Allen, The Constitution at the Threshold
of Life and Death:  A Suggested Approach to Accommodate an Interest in Life and a
Right to Die, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 971, 984 (2004); Cantor, supra note 10, at 88 n.45;
Cantor, Autonomy-Based Rights , supra  note 132, at 46; Cerminara, supra note 10, at R
375; and Ouellette, supra note 110, at 13-18. R
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istic laws, the value of autonomy, and the need to allow people
with disabilities mechanisms to avoid pain, degradation, and
restraint.
Sheila Pouliot was admitted to a state-run hospital in upstate
New York with bleeding in her gastrointestinal tract and what
was initially diagnosed as aspiration pneumonia.206  For years,
she had been fed through a gastrostomy tube, but because of her
bleeding, Pouliot could no longer tolerate tube feeding.207  Physi-
cians advised Pouliot’s family “that she was suffering from what
was likely to be her terminal illness, that she was in pain, and that
further treatment would likely prolong the suffering.”208
Initially, her physicians complied with the family’s request to
withhold all treatment and provide only pain relief.209  Six days
after her admission to the hospital, however, a state agency in-
formed the hospital that New York law did not allow her family
to make the decision to terminate the provision of nutrition and
hydration, and the hospital ordered the physicians to resume
treatment.210
The dispute ended up in court.  Pouliot’s family, physicians,
and guardian sought permission to terminate treatment.211  The
state attorney general argued in favor of continued treatment.212
The trial judge ordered the continuing provision of artificial nu-
trition and hydration based on a straightforward application of
New York law and the consent of the family.213
206 Blouin , 356 F.3d at 352.
207 She had an acute abdomen, manifested by generalized, “severe abdominal
pain and a nonfunctioning intestine.”  Ouellette, supra note 110, at 14.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 15.
211 As the New York District Court explained:
During the hearing, the treating physicians informed the court that there is
a 14-day period during which is it [sic] medically appropriate to withhold
nutrition and that it was their intention to do so while continually assessing
Ms. Pouliot’s readiness to receive nutrition.  The treating physicians also
testified that further treatment to provide nutrition to Ms. Pouliot would
result in prolonging her agony without any significant health or medical
benefits.
Blouin v. Spitzer, 213 F. Supp. 2d 184, 187 (N.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d , 356 F.3d 348 (2d
Cir. 2004).
212 See id.  at 186.
213 On January 3, 2000, the trial judge issued an order that all medical treatment
for Pouliot be terminated, except for nutrition, as tolerated, and hydration care. Id.
at 187.  The next day, “the guardian ad litem  and plaintiff commenced an Article 78
proceeding and petitioned the Supreme Court of New York to enjoin permanently
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The treatment successfully sustained life functions, but Pou-
liot’s condition deteriorated.  Doctors provided Pouliot with as
much nutrition and hydration as was possible over the course of
two months.214  They were limited to providing what they could
through intravenous lines because gastrointestinal bleeding pre-
vented use of the feeding tube.215 The calories that sustained
Pouliot’s life caused her significant pain.  As I describe in a previ-
ous article:
During that time, Ms. Pouliot’s body began to catabolize her
own tissue.  The hydration provided through the [intravenous]
tubes damaged her organs and caused her severe pain.  Fur-
ther, it caused her severe edema, which stretched  [Ms. Pou-
liot’s] skin to the point where it fell off and left raw painful
areas.  She was in agony [and] spent the next two months
moaning and curled in the fetal position.216
Efforts to control Pouliot’s pain were unsuccessful.  After two
months, one of her physicians stated in a consultation note that
the continuation of ANH was “inhumane and . . . causing suffer-
ing.  From a medical standpoint, it [was] outside the bounds of
. . . medically indicated care.”217
Pouliot’s guardian returned to court, this time arguing, with
the agreement of the doctors and ethicists who had examined
Pouliot, that terminating nutrition and hydration would lessen
her pain.218  The problem, said the attorney general, was that the
treatment that was harming Pouliot was technically life sus-
taining, and New York law prohibited a third party, even a court-
appointed guardian or loving family member, from making the
decision to terminate life-sustaining treatment for another per-
son.219  The trial judge eventually issued an order permitting the
the State of New York, its agents, officers and/or employees from further medical
intervention, nutritional sustenance, or other life-sustaining treatment for Ms. Pou-
liot.” Id.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge “temporarily enjoined the
named respondents from providing any medical intervention with regard to nutri-
tional sustenance.” Id.  Pouliot received hydration only until January 7. See id.
Then, after the trial judge was made aware of the limitations in New York law, the
family, guardian, and hospital attorneys agreed to provide Pouliot hydration and to
attempt to provide 900 calories of nutrition, which was an amount sufficient to main-
tain life.  See id . at 186-87.
214 See Blouin v. Spitzer, 356 F.3d 348, 354 (2d Cir. 2004).
215 Id.  at 355 n.5.
216 Ouellette, supra note 110, at 16 (footnote omitted).
217 Blouin , 356 F.3d at 355 n.4; see also  Ouellette, supra note 110, at 17.
218 Blouin , 356 F.3d at 355.
219 See id.
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withdrawal of treatment, despite his acknowledgment that New
York law did not clearly allow such an order.220  Pouliot died on
March 6, 2000, days after the trial court issued its order.221
The case of Scott Matthews had a happier ending.222  Scott was
a twenty-eight-year-old man with profound cognitive and physi-
cal disabilities.223  At the time of the court case, Scott was de-
scribed as “severely malnourished.”224  His disabilities, which
included a swallowing disorder, made it very difficult for him to
be fed orally.225  He had been repeatedly hospitalized for dehy-
dration, malnutrition, and aspiration pneumonia.226  His physi-
cian opined that “Scott’s malnutrition was life threatening and
Scott ‘does not and can not’ get adequate nutrition and hydration
from oral feeding.”227
Scott’s parents went to court to fight an effort by his care prov-
iders and a state agency to surgically place a feeding tube in
Scott.228  Scott’s parents objected to the placement of the feeding
tube because of the possible medical complications of the proce-
dure, and “the effect on Scott’s emotional well-being if he was
denied the social contact that feeding with others [has] pro-
vided.”229  Specifically, his mother explained “that Scott, who is
quadriplegic, nonverbal and incontinent, makes no other purely
voluntary decision than his choice to eat.”230  Replacing oral
feeding with tube feeding would have taken away Scott’s greatest
pleasure.
The mother was supported by a second physician, who came to
know Scott because of a fortuitous visit that occurred when
Scott’s regular physician was on vacation.231  The second physi-
cian testified that it was reasonable to allow Scott to continue
oral feedings given his parents’ concerns.232
220 See id.
221 Id.  at 356.
222 In re Matthews, 650 N.Y.S.2d 373 (App. Div. 1996).
223 Id.  at 374.
224 Id.  (stating that his weight fluctuated between forty-three and forty-seven
pounds).
225 Id.
226 See id.  at 374-75.
227 Id.  at 375.
228 Id.  at 375-76.
229 Id. at 374-75.
230 Id.  at 376 n.7.
231 Id.  at 375.
232 See id.
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The trial court found that Scott suffered from “profound life-
threatening malnutrition.”233  Because Scott had never been
competent to form and express an opinion about the use of a
feeding tube under the clear and convincing evidence standard,
the trial court ordered the use of a feeding tube.234
The New York Appellate Division reversed, finding that the
appropriate standard was not the clear and convincing evidence
standard, but the best interest standard.235  The court emphasized
that even under this standard, New York law does not permit a
parent to “deprive a child of life-saving treatment, however well
intentioned.”236  It went on, however, to interpret the second
doctor’s testimony to support the conclusion that Scott’s life
could be maintained with oral feedings.237  The court concluded
that as long as Scott could sufficiently maintain his life through
oral feedings, a more invasive feeding procedure would be pre-
mature.238  The court cautioned, however, that had evidence
been presented that Scott was being deprived life-sustaining
treatment, it would have granted the request for the tube.239
2. Lessons Learned
The stories of Sheila Pouliot and Scott Matthews teach several
lessons.  First, they show that paternalism can hurt.  Pouliot’s
case is paradigmatic on this point.  The paternalistic laws that
protected her from unscrupulous guardians and hidden eugenics
caused her pain, bodily degradation, and an agonizing death.  By
focusing on protecting her life and her inability to express her
own wishes, the laws took Pouliot’s right to be free from inva-
sions upon her bodily integrity and restraint out of the equation.
233 Id.
234 Id.  at 375-76.
235 As the court explained:
[I]n situations where an individual has always been incompetent to make
his or her own decisions, resolution of consent to treatment issues would be
guided by different principles than those in a situation where a formerly
competent patient subsequently becomes incapable of rendering his or her
own treatment decisions.  Thus, in the case at hand . . . the law relating to
decisions as to life-sustaining treatment for infants is the only fair method
by which Scott’s rights can be assessed.
Id.  at 376-77 (citations omitted).
236 Id. at 377.
237 Id. at 378.
238 Id . at 379.
239 Id.
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Thus, she was forced to receive treatment that “sustained her
life,” but broke her body down at the same time.
Application of the Model Act to Pouliot would have generated
the same result.  Because Pouliot was not competent to make her
own health care decisions, the Model Act would have created the
presumption that Pouliot had “directed . . . her health care prov-
iders to provide . . . nutrition and hydration . . . sufficient to sus-
tain life.”240  None of the exceptions in the Model Act would
have helped Pouliot.  She had no advance directive, could not
give express informed consent, and was not receiving treatment
that was medically impossible, hastening death, or unnecessary to
sustaining her life.241
Pouliot’s case is an extreme example, but other cases involving
judgments about whether or how to treat the dying or the pro-
foundly disabled also raise questions about the right to bodily
integrity and freedom from restraint.  The new activists’ ap-
proach would eliminate individual choice about those values for
people who lack decisionmaking capacity.242
Applying the new activists’ approach to Scott Matthews’s case
demonstrates the problem.  He too would be subject to the pre-
sumption that he directed “his . . . health care providers to pro-
vide him . . . with nutrition and hydration to a degree that is
sufficient to sustain life.”243  The Model Act would prevent his
parents or any public agency or court from withholding nutrition
and hydration.  None of the Model Act’s exceptions would apply.
Thus, the Model Act would appear to require the implementa-
tion of the feeding tube based on the testimony that he was fac-
ing “profound life-threatening malnutrition.”244
Placement of the feeding tube in Scott would have required
surgery that intruded on his bodily integrity.  The surgery carried
the risks of anesthesia, aspiration of vomit, skin irritation from
the tube, ulceration and bleeding into the stomach lining, tube
blockage over time, osmotic diarrhea, and that the feeding tube
might migrate.245  The statute takes into account none of these
240 MODEL ACT, supra note 120, § 3(A).
241 Id.  at § 4(A)-(B).
242 “In short, a policy demanding clear prior expressions as a prerequisite to with-
drawal of life support is inhumane in disregarding the possible harm and degrada-
tion to the now-incompetent patient.”  Cantor, supra note 10, at 93. R
243 See MODEL ACT, supra  note 120, at § 3(A).
244 In re Matthews , 650 N.Y.S.2d at 375.
245 Id . at 375 n.3.
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bodily invasions.
Even more troubling than the physical intrusion, the feeding
tube would have restricted Scott’s freedom to choose to eat,246
and to enjoy the social companionship oral feedings allowed.
With it, Scott would have been deprived of the one activity that
brought him the most pleasure—oral feedings.  Surely, at least
some members of the disability rights community would support
his family’s effort to allow him continued access to that activity,
even if pursuing that course shortened his life.  Ironically, the law
the new activists are pushing to combat a different problem
would have deprived Scott of the pleasure of eating.
To be sure, a judge applying the Model Act to the Matthews
case might have worked the evidence to find that the feeding
tube was not needed to sustain life, like the New York Appellate
Division did.  However, one can easily imagine another case rais-
ing the same issue in which a family does not have the good for-
tune to find a doctor who would support its efforts to continue
oral feeding.  The result in such a case would necessarily be the
imposition of the tube and the concomitant bodily intrusion and
restraint.
The second lesson these cases teach is that family members
and well-intentioned surrogates can be trusted.  In both cases,
the family members acted compassionately to protect the well-
being of their disabled relative.  The new activists would cut fam-
ily members out of the medical decisionmaking process.  Thus,
like Pouliot’s sister, family members would have to sit by help-
lessly and lose what is often a lifelong role as a patient’s
advocate.
Does the family’s role deserve mentioning?  The activists
would surely argue it does not.  From the perspective of the
scholars and activists who believe that nondisabled caregivers
cannot be trusted because they might believe the myth of the
tragic life with disability, it is inappropriate to express concern
for the impact of laws on family members.  Under the approach
adopted by the disability scholars and new activists, the central
driving concerns should be empowerment and protection of the
disabled.
I believe, however, that families and caregivers are central pos-
itive driving forces for empowering the people under their care.
246 See id . at 376 n.7.
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Scott Matthews’s parents and Sheila Pouliot’s family are but two
examples.  Many people with disabilities have loving families and
caregivers who share the community’s passion for protecting and
enabling people with disabilities, particularly the disabled under
their care.247  The new agenda does not even allow for the possi-
bility that a family member might understand and know a loved
one’s wishes, values, strengths, or pain tolerance, and may actu-
ally be working in the individual’s best interest.
The activists prefer to leave decisions to the courts.  Thus, Not
Dead Yet’s Mary Johnson is supporting the Kansas bill that
would require court review of any decision made by a third party
to terminate treatment.248  Her support, I suppose, is based on
the premise that judges are educable in a way that family mem-
bers are not.
Again, the negative effects of this paternalistic bill would hurt
the very people it is intended to help.  The bill would have social
and financial costs.  Requiring court review of medical decisions
would make public otherwise private decisions about health care,
turn caregivers into adversaries, and divert financial resources
from the patient at the center of the controversy to pay for law-
yers.  Such a system would cost the impaired person an unaccept-
able amount.
The third lesson these cases teach is that a right to choose no
treatment can affirm a life well-lived.  While laws such as New
York’s are designed to protect the disabled from bad choices
made by their caretakers, the laws limit the choices available to
people with disabilities.  In Scott Matthews’s case, his parents’
choice empowered him: it gave him socialization and pleasure.
More importantly, perhaps, choice is power.  Giving people
with disabilities choice, even if that choice must be exercised
through a surrogate, affirms the intrinsic worth of each individ-
ual.  By contrast, paternalistic laws view the disabled as so weak
and vulnerable that they need special protection.  As disability
scholar Anita Silvers states, “Characterizing a group as vulnera-
ble further isolates its members from others in society.  Doing so
emphasizes their supposed fragility, which becomes a reason to
247 For a compelling argument in favor of an increased role of families in medical
decisionmaking cases, see Boozang, supra note 129.
248 See  Hanna, supra note 125. R
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deny that they are capable, and therefore deserving, of full social
participation.”249
The power of choice becomes evident from other cases as well.
There are several documented cases of people who desperately
sought the right to die, only to choose to live after winning the
right to choose to refuse treatment.  For example, Elizabeth
Bouvia chose to live after she won her court battle.250  So too did
Larry McAfee, another disabled plaintiff who sought a court or-
der to remove life-sustaining treatment.251  Likewise, only 246 of
the 390 people who went through the lengthy process to obtain a
legal prescription for suicide between 1998 and 2005 under Ore-
gon’s assisted suicide bill ended up using the medication.252  In
such cases, it is possible that once a person knows she can choose
death if life truly does become unbearable, life may feel more
valuable.  Given options and control, people may become reluc-
tant to give up that life, or at least less desperate to leave it.253
By contrast, limiting options for people with disabilities might ac-
tually lead to more deaths by more desperate people who feel
cornered by life with a disability.  In this way, laws protecting
choice in dying may actually affirm life.254
Like the telethons of old, the new activists portray people with
disabilities as victims in need of saving.255  To the extent that the
249 Anita Silvers, Protecting the Innocents from Physician-Assisted Suicide:  Disa-
bility Discrimination and the Duty to Protect Otherwise Vulnerable Groups , in PHY-
SICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE:  EXPANDING THE DEBATE 133, 135 (Margaret P. Battin et
al. eds., 1998).
250 Milani, supra note 63, at 207-09.
251 State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651, 651 (Ga. 1989).
252 Int’l Task Force on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, 8 Years Under Oregon’s
Assisted Suicide Law, available at  http://www.internationaltaskforce.org/orstats.htm.
The annual reports on which the chart is based do not disclose why the patients did
not ultimately use the prescription.
253 See generally id.  (cataloging patients’ reasons for requesting assisted suicide).
254 Kathy L. Cerminara, Therapeutic Death: A Look at Oregon’s Law , 6 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 503, 514 (2000) (discussing empirical research that shows “[t]he
more choices we give individuals, the more they will act as mature, self-determining
adults.  If the physician presents choices to the patient and explains the benefits and
consequences of each one of them, there is greater possibility that the patient will
make a rational decision, thus decreasing the probability of ‘irrational suicide’ occur-
ring out of fear or lack of information”).
255 Anita Silvers has likened the paternalistic views of disabled people to the his-
torically paternalistic views of women.  Portraying disabled people as especially vul-
nerable stereotypes the disabled as a definitively weak class similar to the historical
view of women that kept them from high-stress jobs because they needed “special
protection.” See Silvers, supra  note 249, at 135.  Characterizing people with disabili- R
ties as incompetent, easily coerced, and inclined to end their lives places them in the
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activists may be right, their proposed cure is worse even than the
problem.  Eliminating choice, infantilizing people by dis-
empowering their families, and imposing destructive solutions by
destroying choice, are not effective means of protecting people
with disabilities.256
C. Flawed Reasoning
Identity politics allows the new activists to see every problem,
and to craft every solution through a single lens that focuses ex-
clusively on disability.  As to end-of-life cases, the new activists
see every decision as a judgment about disability:  a decision to
live affirms life with disability as valuable, whereas a decision to
refuse treatment, and thus die, devalues and harms people with
disabilities.
The attempt to explain end-of-life decisionmaking through the
single lens of disability fails.  End-of-life decisionmaking is any-
thing but one-dimensional.  What might work for the community
might be wrong for the individual.  For the new activists’ position
to be correct, each individual’s choice (or that of a surrogate)
must be about life with disability.  Any rejection of medical treat-
ment must be about rejection of life with disability.  Every per-
son at the center of an end-of-life case must be thought of first as
a person with disability.257  All of these assumptions have analyti-
cal flaws.
The arguments offered by the new activists conflate dying with
disability, misidentify persistent vegetative states with other
forms of disability that allow the real possibility of a sapient life,
and insist on a social kinship of every person who uses a feeding
tube.  More importantly, they insist that the patient’s status as a
person with disability takes precedence over all other aspects of
that person’s life, and that perseverance is the only acceptable
roles to which they have been confined by disability discrimination.  “Doing so em-
phasizes their supposed fragility, which becomes a reason to deny that they are capa-
ble.” See id .
256 Better options include improving the provision of services to people with disa-
bilities during their lives, educating the public about the positive potential for life
with disability, enacting safeguards to protect against unscrupulous surrogates, and
perhaps revising our thinking about informed consent in future cases involving disa-
bility. See infra Part IV.
257 Carol Gill expressly argues that “in order for people with disabilities to func-
tion well in this oppressive society, disability should be a ‘positive and central’ part
of their identity.”  Adrienne Asch, Critical Race Theory, Feminism, and Disability:
Reflections on Social Justice and Personal Identity , 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 391, 415 (2001).
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response to disability.  The following discussion examines more
deeply the analytical flaws behind the new agenda.
1. I See Disabled People Everywhere:  The Problem of
Conflation and Inflation
At the heart of the new activists’ agenda, inextricably linked
with the fear of eugenics and the social critique of society’s re-
sponse to disability, is the problem of the insult.  When a person
chooses death over life with disability, or when a person’s surro-
gate makes that decision for a patient who lacks competence to
make her own decisions, members of the disability rights commu-
nity perceive an insult—a judgment that disabled lives are valued
less than other lives.258  The message received is that people
would rather die than live as disabled persons.
The insult results in part from the conflation that plagues the
agenda.  Specifically, the activists conflate all potential forms of
physical and cognitive impairment under the big tent of “disabil-
ity.”  Their agenda applies equally to people with physical im-
pairments like paralysis as it does to people who are in persistent
vegetative states or who are terminally ill.
The problem is that physical impairments, PVSs, and terminal
illnesses are not the same.  Physical impairments that allow sapi-
ent life are fundamentally different from PVSs, and paralysis and
blindness are fundamentally different from terminal cancer.
Disability scholars recognize the differences between disability
and terminal illness.  Indeed, the scholarship is built around the
notion that disability is not all illness. One scholar noted, “The
social model of disability disconnects our conceptualization of
disability from illness and pain so as to ensure that no judgment
258 E.g. , Cerminara, supra note 10, at 343 (describing a woman’s response to the R
Schiavo case:  “I am not a cabbage, an onion, nor a cob of corn”); Laura Hershey,
Killed by Prejudice , THE NATION, May 2, 2005, available at  http://thenation.com/
doc/20050502/hershey (claiming that describing feeding tubes and ventilators as “life
support,” disabled people get put in a different legal category “with less reason to
live”); Mary Johnson, After Terri Schiavo:  Why the Disability Rights Movement
Spoke Out, Why Some of Us Worried, and Where Do We Go from Here? , RAGGED
EDGE MAG., Apr. 2, 2005, at 4, available at  http://www.ragged-edge-mag.com/focus/
postschiavo0405.html (describing the bigotry of the “better dead than disabled”
school); Jenny Morris, Tyrannies of Perfection , NEW INTERNATIONALIST, July 1992,
at 16, available at  http://live.newint.org/issue233/tyrannies.htm (arguing that the ex-
plicit motivation for court rulings that allow a severely disabled person to choose
death over life with disability “is the notion that physical and intellectual impair-
ment inevitably means a life which is not worth living”).
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about the lives of people with disabilities is distorted by uncritical
assumptions about their suffering.”259  To be sure, terminal ill-
ness can disable a person.  But dying people face different ques-
tions than people with other physical impairments do.
Likewise, people in PVSs need much of the same care required
by quadriplegics.  But the conditions are fundamentally different.
Unlike other impairments, a PVS is the actualization of myth of
the tragic life with disability.  That myth says the person with dis-
ability can experience no joy or pleasure in life.  For the PVS
patient, the myth is reality.  A person in a PVS cannot experience
pleasure or pain, because the part of the brain that processes
those functions is destroyed.  The PVS patient is beyond
disability.
This is not to say that a person in a PVS does not deserve re-
spect or care.  The decisions about their care should be made ac-
cording to the wishes expressed by the patients in their advance
directives or as interpreted by their surrogates.  My point is
merely that the condition of a PVS is different, and individual
decisions about a PVS do not reflect on the value of life with
disability.
The activists’ conflation of PVS, terminal illness, and physical
impairment artificially inflates the “insult” problem.  Society has
distinctly different views of life in vegetative states or with termi-
nal illness than life with other physical impairments.  Over ninety
percent of people would not want to be kept alive in a PVS,260
but no similar attitudes exist with respect to life with blindness or
paralysis.  The different attitudes do not reflect disability
prejudice, but the reality that not all “disabilities” are the same.
2. A Choice to Refuse Treatment Is Not a Value Judgment
About Life with Disability.
The new activists’ agenda is not only overbroad, it also inflates
259 ANITA SILVERS ET AL., DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION:   PER-
SPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 76 (1998).
260 As Norman Cantor wrote:
A permanently unconscious state is the principal example of an intolerably
undignified status.  Over ninety percent of people consistently say that they
would not want to be preserved in this condition devoid of emotion or
interaction with a human environment.  In other words, an overwhelming
majority of people would rather die than live “in such a physically, emo-
tionally, and socially impoverished state.”
Cantor, supra  note 10, at 98 (footnote omitted). R
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the role of disability prejudice in individual end-of-life cases.  Its
insistence on continued life as the only answer to disability ig-
nores the complexity of medical decisionmaking.  It also ignores
the reality that while life with disability (if properly defined to
exclude PVSs) can and should be meaningful, physical impair-
ments necessarily involve certain restraints and bodily degrada-
tion.  Decisions to avoid restraint and protect bodily integrity are
not in any way judgments about the value of people with
disabilities.
The following examples demonstrate this disconnect.  I enjoy
driving.  My act and enjoyment of driving in no way reflect a
judgment about people who cannot or do not drive.  I wear a
seatbelt to avoid physical harm in the event of an accident.  My
safety precautions in no way reflect a judgment about those who
have been harmed in car wrecks.  I avoid seeing doctors.  My
aversion to going to the doctor’s office in no way reflects a judg-
ment about people who require constant medical care.  My ac-
tions and preferences simply reflect personal choice; they do not
reflect a judgment about others who live life differently.
End-of-life decisionmaking works in the same way.  A decision
to forgo medical treatment, even life-sustaining medical treat-
ment, may involve decisions to avoid certain conditions that are
part of the daily lives of many individuals with disabilities.  But
“[b]ecause life-sustaining medical intervention constitutes both a
bodily invasion and a personal choice regarding the appropriate
response to an affliction,” every person should have the right to
reach his or her own decision about the medical choices.261  A
personal assessment about pain, bodily intrusions, physical limi-
tations, bodily integrity, and freedom from restraint is no more a
judgment about the value of people who live with disability than
is the decision to wear a seatbelt.  Those choices are personal and
unrelated to the value of other people who live with the
impairments.
3. The Rejection of Feeding Tubes Is Not Disability Prejudice
Feeding tubes deserve special attention.  First, the attempt to
remove Terri Schiavo’s feeding tube triggered unprecedented at-
tention and second-guessing of settled principles of law.  Second,
the activists have focused their immediate attention on feeding
tubes.
261 Id. at 85.
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Harriet McBryde Johnson explained the social kinship she,
and others in the movement, feel with people fed with feeding
tubes:
I watch nourishment flowing into a slim tube that runs through
a neat, round, surgically created orifice in Ms. Schiavo’s abdo-
men, and I’m almost envious.  What effortless intake!  Due to
a congenital neuromuscular disease, I am having trouble swal-
lowing, and it’s a constant struggle to get by mouth the calo-
ries my skinny body needs.  For whatever reason, I’m still
trying, but I know a tube is in my future.262
Because she may need a feeding tube someday, McBryde John-
son feels that no one should be denied one.  Instead, she believes
it is a piece of equipment, like a wheelchair, which should never
be denied.263
I agree that no one should be denied a feeding tube, but no
one should be denied the choice to refuse a feeding tube either.
In the first place, feeding tubes are not like wheelchairs.  They
cannot be used without surgical intervention and the accompany-
ing risk of infection.264  The tubes themselves have an impact on
a person’s bodily integrity that must be balanced against their
benefits.  Moreover, feeding tubes limit a person’s ability to take
food orally, whereas wheelchairs do not limit a person’s ability to
walk.265  For this reason, an individual’s objection to a feeding
tube might have nothing at all to do with disability.
Consider Scott Matthews.  Scott’s family asserted the desire to
avoid a feeding tube so that he could continue the activity he
enjoyed most in his life.  The desire to eat, the social enjoyment
of a shared meal, and the taste of food are to some so valuable an
experience that losing those abilities would be devastating.
Scott’s parents’ decision to avoid the feeding tube reflected val-
ues that were inherently personal to Scott; the decision had noth-
ing to do with disability prejudice.  The new activists’ legislation
would deny all of us the ability to decide that the social benefits
of eating outweigh the risk of a premature death.
The argument that fear of feeding tubes is a form of disability
prejudice focuses on the physical aspect of disability: the inability
262 McBryde Johnson, supra note 90.
263 Id.
264 See In re Matthews, 650 N.Y.S.2d 373, 375 nn.2-3 (App. Div. 1996) (describing
the surgical procedure and risks involved in inserting a feeding tube).
265 In this way, feeding tubes are distinctly different from wheelchairs that enable
mobility.
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to eat.  Disability scholars argue that the focus on the physical is
misplaced, one stating, “[I]ndependence need not be viewed in
physical terms; rather, self-direction, self-determination, and par-
ticipation in decisionmaking about one’s life are more . . . au-
thentic measures of desirable independence, or better,
interdependence.”266  The focus on the physical aspect of the in-
ability to eat improperly displaces the importance of self-deter-
mination in the decision to use or not use a feeding tube.  Like
with other decisions, an individual’s decision to accept or reject a
feeding tube should belong to the individual.
IV
CONVERSATIONS GO TWO WAYS
On the one hand, I am critical of the new activists’ agenda, and
I firmly believe it should be rejected.  On the other hand, I take
no issue with much of the message propounded by the disability
rights community.  Indeed, I agree that society fails itself when it
devalues the worth of people with disabilities by its collective at-
titude and actions.  I also agree that the history and threat of
eugenics and forced sterilization are too recent to suggest that
the activists’ fear of these things is outdated or unnecessary.267  I
do take issue, however, with the way the disability rights commu-
nity has applied its theory to end-of-life decisionmaking and to
the legal and advocacy positions that result.
I would argue, moreover, that the extreme positions that the
new activists are taking in end-of-life cases give policymakers,
bioethicists, health care providers, and scholars who favor auton-
omy rights a reason to dismiss the entire field of disability studies
as fringe.  Dismissing the field would be a mistake.268  Disability
theory has much to offer health policy.
First, disability theory identifies systematic failures with health
care and health policy.  Some of those failures come to light in
end-of-life cases.  The much-discussed case of Elizabeth Bouvia
is a good example of systematic failures.  Bouvia was socially iso-
266 Asch, supra note 2, at 313. R
267 Lightning rods like Princeton’s Peter Singer, who advocate that in some situa-
tions parents should be allowed to euthanize their severely disabled newborns, see
supra note 87, eliminate the contention that fear of eugenics is unfounded.
268 In fact, noted scholar and ethicist Howard Brody admitted to making that very
mistake.  Howard Brody, A Bioethicist Offers an Apology , CITY PULSE (Lansing,
Mich.), Oct. 6, 2004, available at  http://archives.lansingcitypulse.com/041006/fea-
tures/health.asp.
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lated in a hospital by a system that dealt only with the medical
aspects of disability.  A system that focuses exclusively on cure
has little to offer the permanently disabled.  A greater focus on
long-term and rehabilitative care could change the reality of exis-
tence for people with permanent physical impairments so they
are not left alone in hospitals without any means of achieving
their full potential.
Second, disability scholars call attention to the way in which
judges and lawyers needlessly devalue the lives of people with
physical impairments and perpetuate the myth of the tragedy of
life with disability.  The criticism of the Bouvia  decision and ones
like it is spot on.  Bouvia’s request to avoid medical treatment
should not have been granted because her physical condition de-
valued her life.  Her request should have been granted because it
was her decision.
The cases involving treatment refusals by Jehovah’s Witnesses
provide a better model than the Bouvia  decision for judicial
opinions in treatment refusal cases involving people with disabili-
ties.269  In affirming the right of members of the Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses to refuse blood transfusions, the courts do not assess the
reasonableness of the religious belief that one should not take
blood.  The courts ask only if the person is competent to make
that choice.  Similarly, when asked to review treatment refusal
cases involving disabilities, the courts need not justify the deci-
sion itself as reasonable by talking about the alleged hopeless-
ness of life with disability.  Courts need simply assess the
competency of the decisionmaker to make an informed choice.
Third, and perhaps most important, disability scholars cor-
rectly note that there is a genuine need to question whether soci-
ety is too quick to accept as reasonable the decision of a newly
disabled person to die rather than to continue to live with a disa-
bility.  I call this the Million Dollar Baby  problem.  In the film
Million Dollar Baby , the character played by Hilary Swank
269 See, e.g. , Stamford Hosp. v. Vega, 674 A.2d 821, 824-25 (Conn. 1996) (involv-
ing refusal of blood transfusion by Jehovah’s Witness who had bled heavily after
delivering child); Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 78-79 (N.Y. 1990) (involving
the refusal of blood transfusion by thirty-six-year-old Jehovah’s Witness following
cesarean section); cf. Thor v. Superior Court of Solano County, 855 P.2d 375, 382
(Cal. 1993) (affirming right of competent quadriplegic prisoner to refuse food, nec-
essary medical care, and treatment).  Norman Cantor points to these latter two cases
as ones in which a court’s acceptance of a treatment refusal decision is not a value
judgment about the reason for the refusal but rather is a personal self determination
for the patient. See  Cantor, supra  note 10, at 85 & nn.21 & 23. R
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asked for and received euthanasia shortly after suffering a cata-
strophic disability.270  The disability rights community con-
demned the movie as perpetuating disability prejudice.271  As is
clear from the rest of this paper, I am not concerned with the
character’s ultimate decision.  The problem, as I see it, is that the
decision was precipitous.
Disability scholarship has produced hard evidence that people
who face sudden catastrophic injury might not be able to give
informed consent as quickly as previously thought.272  The stud-
ies show that when people are in a “liminal state,” that is, after
they have lost their old identity as fully functioning but before
they’ve accepted their new identity as a person with a disability,
they may be unable to process information or recognize the po-
tential for a quality life with disability.273  Thus, they may be in-
clined to refuse treatment early after the change.
The scholarship suggests that the notion of what it takes to
give informed consent should be revisited in cases of sudden dis-
ability.  If individuals are truly unable to process information,
how can they make informed decisions?  Proposals for reforming
the informed consent process274 deserve further study, as does
270 MILLION DOLLAR BABY (Warner Bros. 2004).
271 See, e.g., Daniel Costello, Assisted Suicide at Center Stage Once Again:  Award-
Winning Movies and Upcoming Legislation Give New Urgency to the Contentious
Issue , L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2005, at F1 (noting that disability advocates expressed
concerns that the film stigmatizes those with recent disabilities); John Hockenberry,
And the Loser Is . . ., MILLION DOLLAR BIGOT, http://www.milliondollarbigot.org/
loser.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2006) (criticizing the film).
272 See, e.g., Gary L. Albrecht & Patrick J. Devlieger, The Disability Paradox:
High Quality of Life Against All Odds , 48 SOC. SCI. & MED. 977, 980 (1999) (“Indi-
viduals, families, and communities are unprepared to recognize and seldom ready to
accept disability.”); Asch, supra note 2, at 312-13 (quoting a 1987 report indicating R
that the onset of impairment may delay adaptation and comprehension); David R.
Patterson et al., When Life Support Is Questioned Early in the Care of Patients with
Cervical-Level Quadriplegia , 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 506, 506 (“Patients frequently
have a diminished capacity to make important decisions during the first several
months after an injury . . . .”).
273 Susan Merrill Squier uses this term to characterize unsettled stages of human
existence. SUSAN MERRILL SQUIER, LIMINAL LIVES:  IMAGINING THE HUMAN AT
THE FRONTIERS OF BIOMEDICINE 3-4 (2004).  For a very personal and sensitive
description of one family’s experience with life in a liminal state, see RICHARD
GALLI, RESCUING JEFFREY (2000).
274 Arthur Caplan and others argue for an educational model of informed consent
that stresses that a patient needs an opportunity to experience the post-traumatic
phase of care.  The educational model of informed consent allows the treatment
team to insist paternalistically on treatment during the initial period following a
sudden-onset disability because the patient is not yet fully informed about the po-
tential for quality life with disability.  Arthur L. Caplan et al., Ethical & Policy Issues
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the suggestion for “disability consults” as a regular part of medi-
cal treatment.275
The passion with which the new activists argue that medical
decisionmaking at the end of life must be limited to protect the
disabled from discrimination demonstrates the depth of the fear
and distrust the community has in its own members, lawmakers,
health care providers, and society itself.  Some of that fear is pro-
voked by individuals like Peter Singer who argue for the right of
parents to kill severely “damaged” newborns.276  But most of
that fear and distrust can be linked to lived experiences of people
with disabilities.277  Attention to disability scholarship can only
enrich end-of-life policy.
CONCLUSION
Arguing against the disability rights community on issues that
concern disability rights is problematic.  Community members
speak with a power and authority born of experience.  But the
power the collective voice carries is the very reason the message
must be examined critically.  It would be a perverse irony if the
legacy of the same community that established civil rights for
persons with disabilities were the imposition of an absolute limi-
tation on the liberty rights of all of us as we experience the dying
process with our family members.
The purpose of this Article is not to suggest that disability is
reason to kill.  Nor is it to suggest that the disability rights com-
munity is wrong to express that it is dangerous and insulting to
people living with disabilities to allow people to terminate their
own or other people’s lives because of a physical disability.  To
the contrary, ethicists, judges, and lawmakers should be very cog-
nizant of those concerns.  The purpose of this Article is to sug-
gest that the solution proposed by the new activists is even more
dangerous than the danger being fought against.
Taking away options and power in medical decisionmaking for
people too disabled to run their own care is demeaning.  By con-
trast, permitting people with disabilities, their family members,
or other surrogates to make reasonable choices about medical
in Rehabilitative Medicine , 17 HASTINGS CTR. REP. SPECIAL SUPP., Aug. 1987, at S1,
S11-14.
275 Asch, supra  note 8, at S31. R
276 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
277 See, e.g. , JOHNSON, supra note 20; MCBRYDE JOHNSON, supra note 77.
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care, including artificial nutrition and hydration, is a statement of
profound respect for personhood.  Giving all people a voice in
their medical care respects and recognizes that all people bring to
decisionmaking a lifetime of experience, pain thresholds, toler-
ance for intrusions of the body, the wish to sleep, the ability to sit
still, prior relationships with doctors and hospitals, the depth of
attachment to particular freedoms or abilities, and the other real-
ities of the human condition.  In some cases, the only way to give
a person a voice is to give that person a voice through a surro-
gate.  In a real way, a surrogate decisionmaker for a mentally
incapacitated patient is like a wheelchair for a person who cannot
walk.  It is not a perfect substitute, but it is the best possible ac-
commodation.  One person’s preference to terminate treatment
is not a judgment about the value of another person’s life.  It is a
statement about that individual only:  that for this person, with
this history, this experience, and this existence, the treatment is
not wanted.  That said, judges, ethicists, and physicians have, for
the most part, accepted as true the myth of the tragedy of life
with disability.  That myth should play no role in law or medicine.
I will conclude by issuing challenges to both sides of the de-
bate.  To disability rights activists, consider the possibility that
medical decisionmaking is about more than disability, and that
limiting options hurts all of us.  Also, reconsider the practice of
bundling terminal illness and persistent vegetative states into the
scope of disability.  The social model of disability hinges on the
possibility of meaningful sapient life when adequate social sup-
port is available.  The argument loses credibility in the case of the
dying and permanently unconscious.  And to scholars, judges,
and policymakers who argue in favor of autonomy, listen to the
disability movement.  Consider how negative characterizations of
life with disability such as the description presented in Bouvia
demean the existence of millions of people who live and even
thrive with similar conditions.  Moreover, listen to calls for the
incorporation of patient, family, and provider education about
the real possibility for a quality life in all cases involving disabil-
ity.  That educational process will help all of us become informed
about the realities of life with disability so that when we consent
to treatment, the consent is based on real information, not fear
and prejudice.
